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ABSTRACT 
  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons 
complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities 
containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of 
the weapons stockpile.  The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, 
closed nuclear weapons complex cities.  Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to 
support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant 
closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge 
proliferation.  
This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six 
of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities.  This study finds that the 
presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration.  However, 
the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing 
closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities.  Further, these 
results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up 
of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across 
time.  Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration 
immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and 
societal factors became significant in later years.  Two significant policy conclusions are 
derived from this research.  First, higher levels of income are found to increase out-
migration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by 
increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive.  Second, this 
study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new 
Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from 
the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of potential 
proliferants. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Background and Motivation for Research 
“Given that nuclear weaponry is a forty-year-old technology, what is surprising is not 
that it has spread, but that it has not spread further.” 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 19771 
 
1.1 Background 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the country and its economy in a 
state of upheaval that few Westerners could imagine.  In his book titled Moscow DMZ 
(1996) the first executive director of the International Science and Technology Center 
(ISTC), Glenn E. Schweitzer, relays commentaries from colleagues and friends who lived 
in or visited Moscow during this time.2  Policy experts in Moscow claimed, “If the 
Russian economy doesn’t turn around very soon, there will be another coup attempt that 
will succeed; and we’ll be back to the Cold War.”  Environmental experts concerned 
about high levels of radioactive and toxic chemicals exclaimed, “Don’t drink the water or 
shop at the markets; and go west every two months to get aired out.”  The 
mathematicians and physicists stated, “We must save Russian science.  It’s on the brink 
of disaster, and the whole world will soon lose this irreplaceable intellectual resource.”  
Visitors to the formerly secret weapons complex cities reported, “It is no wonder that 
plutonium is being stolen from Russia.  No one even knows what was stored in some of 
those run-down and old warehouses so many years ago.” 
It was comments like these, combined with the existence of 35,000 nuclear 
weapons, more than 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), over 150 metric 
tons of military-use plutonium, ten previously secret “closed” nuclear weapons complex 
                                                          
1 Joseph S Nye, Jr., “Time to Plan for the Next Generation of Nuclear Technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Vol. 33, Issue 8: 38-41, Oct. 1977, referenced in Stephen M. Meyer, Probing the Causes of 
Nuclear Proliferation: An Empirical Analysis, 1940-1973, Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of 
Michigan. 1978. 
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cities, and literally dozens of other production facilities, as well as biological weapons 
complex cities, spread around countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) that triggered 
the interest and concern of the United States and other nations of the world.3  In 1992, the 
U.S. Department of State, twelve European nations, Russia, and Japan joined forces in 
Moscow and established the ISTC to help Russia downsize its military establishment.  
Sweitzer explains that the principle task of the ISTC was “to help prevent a nuclear brain 
drain from Russia into countries on our not-so-favored list and at the same time to 
encourage Russia to use its military technologies in rebuilding a civilian science and 
technology base that could lead to a healthier economy.”4  Why was such an expensive 
and elaborate international program necessary? 
Despite the political difficulties and rapidly slowing economy after the Soviet 
collapse, the Russian government managed to find resources to keep the large weapons 
complex operational.  However, the situation was tenuous, to say the least.  Payment of 
salaries to workers became erratic, long-standing research teams were dissolved, and 
many laboratories were closed.  Anxiety and fear spread as the world became aware of 
the unemployment status of so many thousands of expert weapons scientists and 
engineers throughout the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union.  
To better understand this concern, it is necessary to understand the birth and growth of 
the Soviet military complex, specifically the cities and production facilities of the 
weapons complex. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Glenn E. Schweitzer, Moscow DMZ, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996, pp. 3-4. 
3 Although estimates of the stockpile size vary, these numbers provided by the Nuclear Threat Initiative 
coincide well with estimates from other sources. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington D.C.,  
http://www.nti.org.  (Some NTI estimates are taken from the Natural Resources Defense Council website, 
“USSR/Russian Nuclear Stockpile, 1949-2002” http://www.nrdc.org.) 
4 Schweitzer, 5. 
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After World War II, the Soviet Union began devoting significant resources to the 
development of its political and military power.  During the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet 
government created ten secret, “closed” nuclear cities across the vast landscape of the 
Asian continent, where an estimated 120,000 workers were employed to develop the 
Russian nuclear arsenal.5  In addition, many other closed secret cities were engaged in 
chemical and biological weapons research and manufacturing, enrichment of plutonium, 
high-level space research, and military intelligence work.  The exact number of these 
facilities is questionable, as many were never acknowledged by the Soviet government 
before or after its demise.  However, one report estimates the total number of secret 
and/or closed cities in the Soviet Union’s military-industrial complex to have been more 
than fifty, nearly all of which are located in what is now the Russian Federation.6  These 
closed, often secret, cities contained everything a normal city might, except that the 
selection of goods was often much better than in a normal Soviet city.  In addition, these 
cities generally offered a higher standard of living, reduced housing costs, and almost no 
criminal activity, making it possible to attract highly qualified specialists, including the 
top graduates from the country’s most prestigious universities.  Consequently, the Soviet 
Union’s weapons complex facilities traditionally employed the most brilliant scientists 
and high-tech weapons specialists available.  After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 
1991, these individuals became the focus of much government funding effort by the 
United States and other countries, and are now the focus of this dissertation.  The issue of 
concern is the migration of these scientists and engineers.  If these individuals are unable 
                                                          
5 Valentin Tikhonov, Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation, 
Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April, 2001, p. 7. 
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to remain employed, or become re-employed, in Russia’s new economy, they may 
migrate to other countries and sell their skills and knowledge at a tremendous cost to 
international security.   
United States efforts to aid Russia in downsizing its weapons complex began with 
a bipartisan action in 1991 when Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar program.  This 
program was co-sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) to 
lay the foundation for the cooperative security agenda.  The objective of the cooperative 
security agenda is to work jointly with Russia and other states of the FSU to reduce the 
threat posed by the legacy of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.  A broad set of programs 
involving several U.S. agencies has evolved as a result of this agenda.  These programs 
receive approximately $900 million to $1 billion per year, with the primary beneficiaries 
being the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State.7   
In addition to the previously mentioned ISTC, many other U.S. funded and 
sponsored programs have been established, all with the goal of preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Russia.  The methodology employed 
to accomplish this task varies from one program to another.  Some focus money and 
effort on preventing migration of scientists and engineers from the former Soviet 
weapons complex, while others focus on transforming the capital and infrastructure to 
non-weapons applications.  Still others are dedicated to the dismantlement and 
destruction of weapons complex facilities that remain in Russia and other Newly 
Independent States.  Regardless of the tactics employed, all of the U.S. programs have 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime, New York: 
Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995, pp 110-111. 
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maintained a goal of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
materials and knowledge. 
1.2 Ten Previously Closed Nuclear Weapons Facilities 
Russia’s ten closed nuclear cities were created for the sole purpose of supporting 
nuclear weapons production and research, and to provide a livelihood for the families of 
facility employees.8  Figure 1 below provides a map of the ten closed nuclear cities across 
the vast expanse of the Russian Federation, their proximity to Moscow, and to one 
another.   
Figure 1: Closed Nuclear Cities Map 
 
Reproduction: Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Kenneth N. Luongo, “Improving U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cooperation,” Issues in Science and Technology, 
Online, Fall 2001, http://www.nap.edu/issues/18.1/luongo.html. 
8 Sokova, Elena, “The Closed Nuclear Cities: Federal Control vs. Local and Regional Influences,” 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu. 
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In addition, the map also shows which cities were historically engaged in nuclear 
warhead design, assembly/disassembly, and highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 
plutonium production (both used as core material for nuclear weapons). 
The closed city locations were chosen by Stalin’s last security chief, Lavrenti 
Beria.  He is reported to have chosen the sites based on their remoteness, yet relatively 
close proximity to a railway.  The ten closed nuclear cities were also “secret” cities, 
which meant they never appeared on publicly viewed maps and were completely 
surrounded by “a perimeter of cleared land in front of a barbed and electrified fence with 
watchtowers.”9 
Historically, the nuclear cities were controlled by the Soviet Union Ministry of 
Nuclear Energy (commonly known as Minatom since 1994) and nearly all funding came 
from federal grant and tax revenue transfers, or from government defense contracts.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, funding either became erratic and delayed, or 
ceased entirely.  In many instances, employees went months without receiving payment 
for their services and facilities operated with little or no electricity, as bills could not be 
paid without the regular government funding.   Although federal financing of the nuclear 
facilities is reported to have stabilized in the last two or three years, with the significant 
reduction in defense contracts and government funding from Moscow, these facilities 
now rely on civilian contracts, competitive bids for government funding, and 
international assistance in order to continue operations, even at a decreased level of 
production.10   
                                                          
9 The Economist, “Darkness Visible,” December 25, 1993-January 7, 1994. 
10 Ibid. 
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Table 1 below provides a summary of the ten previously secret, closed nuclear 
cities identifying their current names, their Soviet Era names, the approximate year that 
each was established, and the facility located in each city.   
Table 1: Closed Nuclear Cities and Associated Facilities in the Russian Federation 
City Name Soviet-Era Name Date Established Facility on Location 
Lesnoy Sverdlovsk-45 1947 Electrokhimpribor Combine 
Novouralsk Sverdlovsk-44 1941 
Urals Electrochemical Combine (UEKhK), consisting of 
an electrochemical converter engineering plant, an 
electromechanical plant, and an instrumentation plant 
Ozersk Chelyabinsk-65 1945 
Mayak Production Association (PO Mayak) began 
operations when first reactor became operational in 1948; 
consists of the Mayak Chemical Combine, the 
Chelyabinsk-60 Research Facility, and the still under 
construction South Urals Nuclear Power Plant 
Sarov                 
(Kremlev prior 
to Aug 1995) 
Arzamas-16 1946 
2 nuclear weapons-related facilities: 1) All-Russian 
Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics 
(VNIIEF), which is a nuclear weapons design laboratory, 
and 2) Avangard Electromechanical Plant, which is a 
nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly plant 
Seversk Tomsk-7 
Construction 
began in 1949, 
opened in 1954 
Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) 
Snezhinsk Chelyabinsk-70 
Construction 
began in 1955; city 
founded on May 
23, 1957 
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical 
Physics (VNIITF) 
Trekhgornyy Zlatoust-36 mid-1950s Instrument-Making Plant 
Zarechnyy Penza-19 
Founded in 1954, 
construction on 
plant began in 
1955 
Start Production Association (PO Start) and the Research 
and Design Institute of Radio Electronics Engineering 
(NIKIRET) 
Zelenogorsk Krasnoyarsk-45 1955 Electrochemical Plant (EKhZ) 
Zheleznogorsk Krasnoyarsk-26 1950 Mining and Chemical Combine (GKhK) and Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant (Krasmash) 
Created by the author with information obtained from Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org 
 
Table 2 follows and provides information regarding city population and 
employment levels at each of the nuclear weapons complex facilities.   
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Table 2:  City Population and Employment Levels at Nuclear Complex Facilities 
City Name City Population (year) Number Employed at Nuclear 
Weapons Complex Facility (year) 
Lesnoy 58,000 (2001) 10,000 (2001) 
Novouralsk 96,000 (2001) 48,000 (2001) 
Ozersk 85,000 (2001) 12,000 to 17,000 (2001) 
Sarov 84,000 (2000) 18,500 (1997) 
Seversk 115,000 (2001) 15,000 to 20,000 (2001) 
Snezhinsk 49,000 (1999) 15,000 to 16,000 (1999) 
Trekhgornyy 33,000 (2001) majority of town population 
Zarechnyy 64,000 (1996) 11,000 (1995) 
Zelenogorsk 67,000 (2001) 10,000 (2000) 
Zheleznogorsk 100,000 (2001) 8,000 (2001) 
Created by the author with information obtained from Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org. 
All information presented in tables 1 and 2 is provided by the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, established jointly by Ted Turner and Sam Nunn as an organization working to 
“strengthen global security by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.”11  For a detailed summary of the ten closed 
nuclear cities, including the activities that have occurred historically and/or are occurring 
presently, the employment situation, the government contract and funding changes, and 
the economic well-being of the citizens, the reader is referred to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative website.  A brief overview of this information is provided below. 
1.3 Overview of Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Facilities 
 While the reader is encouraged to delve into the details of Russia’s nuclear 
complex cities and the changes since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the author sees fit 
to mention some important points.  All of the Minatom facilities have reduced production 
since the Soviet breakup, resulting in either a reduction in employees or a decrease in the 
number of hours that each employee is able to work.  Many of the facilities have 
converted, or are in the process of converting, from military to commercial production.  
                                                          
11 Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
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This conversion may open employment opportunities for some, but decrease 
opportunities for others who do not have the skills necessary to become employed or 
remain employed in the new sector.  All of the closed cities have experienced budget 
deficits as a result of back payments of transfer funds from the Russian government.  This 
debt has created numerous problems.  The Minatom facilities have gone into debt to 
employees who have typically gone months without full payment of their salaries, and in 
some cases no payment at all.  The facilities have also frequently gone into debt to 
suppliers of raw materials, electricity, and other production inputs.  These debts have 
spread through entire cities in the form of decreased demand for goods and services, 
impacting overall economic prosperity and growth.  These closed nuclear cities that 
historically received the best goods and services in Russia are now no better off than any 
other city in the country, and some are facing dire economic conditions.   
It is believed that these poor economic conditions have prompted many citizens to 
flee the closed cities in search of better opportunities.  Although most are expected to 
have relocated to other Russian cities, there are concerns that some have migrated, or will 
migrate, to other (possibly rogue) nations.  As a precaution, several United States 
programs have been established though the Department of Energy, the State Department, 
and the Department of Defense to prevent the proliferation of materials and knowledge 
from the Russian closed nuclear cities.  A summary of these programs and the cities 
affected is provided in appendix A of this dissertation. 
1.4 The Proliferation Threat 
 The spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons knowledge or material 
to other countries (referred to as horizontal proliferation) has been brought to the 
forefront of public awareness since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 
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the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.  Recent articles in The New York Times, 
Washington Post, and many other nationally renowned papers have expressed concern 
that individuals like Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network may have made 
great strides toward obtaining plans or materials for a nuclear weapon.  In fact, according 
to Washington Post, “in 1998 bin Laden called it a religious duty to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction.”12  In this same report, Washington Post stated that “Russian officials 
have reported dozens of attempts to steal enriched uranium or plutonium since 1990,” and 
“unidentified terrorists have twice recently tried and failed to penetrate Russian top-secret 
nuclear storage facilities.”  Although the loss of life on September 11th was 
unprecedented, it is fair to say that the devastation would have been even more 
horrendous if bin Laden had used weapons of mass destruction in his attacks on 
American soil. 
 Unfortunately, Osama bin Laden is not the only cause for concern in a discussion 
of proliferation threat.  Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have long been labeled as “rogue 
states” whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is considered an imminent danger 
not only to their bordering neighbors, but to the entire world.  In his 1978 dissertation, 
Stephen Meyer refers to nations with these types of nuclear aspirations as “international 
pariahs.”13  He goes on to say that “the pariah’s acquisition of atomic weapons would 
make it impossible for the countries of the world, and in particular the regional countries, 
to continue to ignore it.”  Meyer’s statement reminds us of the underlying reason for 
concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons knowledge and materials. 
                                                          
12 Washington Post. “U.S. Fears Bin Laden Made Nuclear Strides,” Tuesday, December 4, 
2001, A01. 
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The motivation for a discussion of proliferation at this point is to make the reader 
aware of the impending proliferation situation if Soviet Union weaponeers are 
unemployed and unaccounted for in the new FSU economies.  In fact, the concern goes 
beyond the current situation, as future generations of weapons complex employees are 
now in training to continue working in this highly unstable institution.  As the United 
States continues to push Russia to dismantle existing weapons and cease production of 
uranium and plutonium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons, apprehension exists 
about the employment of scientists and engineers who have lost their jobs, as well as a 
new generation of Russians who are now graduating from scientific and engineering 
institutes.  Further attention is focused on the retiring weapons complex employees for 
whom future benefits and pensions are highly unlikely.  Consequently, preventing 
nuclear proliferation from Russia will require long-term efforts through numerous aid and 
grant programs. 
1.5 Past and Present Research 
In the years since the demise of the Soviet Union, a plethora of articles and 
reports have addressed the tenuous situations in FSU countries.  Of issue have been the 
failing market economies, the concern for security of nuclear and biological weapons 
material, and the assistance programs put into place by many other countries of the world.  
Some articles address the concern of a technological “brain drain” from the weapons 
complex cities and the proliferation issues involved in such a knowledge transfer, while 
other articles detail the loss of scientific knowledge and growth in the Newly Independent 
States (NIS).  Still others focus on the lack of payment to scientists and engineers, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 Stephen M. Meyer, Probing the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation: An Empirical Analysis, 1940-1973, 
Ann Arbor Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1978, pgs 76-77. 
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attempt to track the flow of these people immediately after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and even manage some analysis of the personal characteristics of these 
individuals. 
The motivation for this dissertation is to determine whether or not the enormous 
amount of U.S. funding effort in Russia’s closed nuclear weapons complex has impacted 
migration behavior.  In the absence of migration data specific to the closed nuclear cities, 
this question will be answered through an analysis of migration behavior in different 
regions of the Russian Federation14.  Specifically, regions that contain closed nuclear 
weapons complex cities will be compared to regions that do not contain closed nuclear 
cities in order to answer the following four questions.  Is the rate of migration different in 
regions that contain closed nuclear cities than in regions without closed nuclear cities?  
Has the rate of migration changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent implementation of these funding programs?  Are the factors that influence 
migration the same in regions that contain closed nuclear cities as in regions where 
nuclear cities are not present?  Lastly, have these factors changed over time?  Answers to 
these questions will provide a basis for formulating policies to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons knowledge from the Russian Federation, as well as other FSU countries. 
 Although fifteen independent countries have formed from the lands of the Former 
Soviet Union, regions within the Russian Federation will be the sole focus of this 
report.15  There are two reasons for this restriction.  First, Russian data is more readily 
available and more reliable than that of the other FSU countries.  Second, all ten of the 
                                                          
14 The descriptor “region” is used throughout this study to describe a geographic area of Russia, similar to a 
“state” in the United States or a “province” in Canada. 
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previously secret closed nuclear weapons complex cities are located on Russian soil, and 
these cities are the focus of most U.S. Department of Energy funding efforts.   
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are arranged as follows.  Chapter 2 
summarizes four labor migration theories in economic and sociology literature.  Chapter 
3 develops a theoretical model of labor migration, while chapter 4 is devoted to 
empirically testing migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, distinguishing 
between those that contain closed nuclear cities and those that do not.  Chapter 5 
summarizes the conclusions from the empirical testing conducted in chapter 4, and 
provides other pertinent information generated from the regression analysis.  In addition, 
chapter 5 provides policy and program recommendations best suited to prevent migration, 
and consequently reduce the proliferation threat, from Russia and other FSU countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldava, 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of Labor Mobility: Economic and Sociological Explanations 
for Migration 
 
“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the 
wretched refuse of your teeming shore; send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me.” 
Emma Lazarus, 188316 
 
2.1 Background 
For over 100 years the Statue of Liberty has stood at Ellis Island proclaiming 
these words to the millions of immigrants that have arrived to the United States of 
America.  Why have so many people come to the United States since it became a 
sovereign nation on July 4, 1776?  Some arrive in search of political or religious freedom.  
Some arrive searching for a place where they will not be persecuted for their cultural 
beliefs or their ethnicity.  Some arrive in search of a better life with more opportunity for 
fame and fortune.  Some hope to provide their children and their children’s children with 
a better life and more opportunity than they had.  Regardless of the reason, the migration 
of people from one country (or region) to another has attracted much attention in the 
fields of labor economics and sociology. 
Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, the terms migration and mobility 
will be used interchangeably to describe the movement of individuals from one area 
(town, region, or country) to another.  The term immigration describes the arrival of 
individuals to an area, while the term emigration describes the departure of individuals 
from an area.  The term net migration is used to describe the difference between 
immigration and emigration.  Net migration is positive when immigration exceeds 
emigration, and is negative when emigration exceeds immigration. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
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2.2 Labor Mobility Models Summarized 
Four types of labor mobility studies dominate the existing literature. The first type 
posits that labor reallocation occurs in response to market needs.  This collection of 
articles typically focuses on wage differentials between areas and the movement of labor 
supply in response to the wage differences.  This is referred to as the classical 
competitive model of labor mobility.  The second type of labor mobility study focuses on 
and emphasizes the costs and benefits of mobility for the individual decision-maker.  This 
type of labor mobility model is generally referred to as the investment in human capital 
model, where the potential mover calculates the expected costs and benefits associated 
with migration prior to making a decision.  The third type of study focuses on and 
emphasizes the conditions of the societies that individuals emigrate from and immigrate 
to, as well as the individuals’ position or status in each society.  These are generally 
referred to as residential preference and satisfaction models.  Finally, the fourth type of 
study explains migration as being directly dependent on existing capital, as well as 
investment in and growth toward, future capital.  All four types of mobility models are 
somewhat interconnected, as it is assumed that potential migrants will analyze all market 
conditions, including wages, demographic variables, and societal characteristics, when 
making relocation decisions.  However, studies done under each type of labor mobility 
analysis typically hold all other factors constant in order to extrapolate the effect under 
consideration.  This means that the existing research on labor mobility can be easily 
divided into these four areas for consideration. 
 While it is the purpose of this paper to focus on the migration and mobility of 
individuals in different regions of Russia and the closed nuclear weapons complex cities, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Emma Lazarus, The “New Colossus”, The Statue of Liberty, Ellis Island, New York, Nov. 2, 1883. 
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it is the purpose of this chapter to provide the economic and sociological explanations for 
migration in general terms.  This chapter will discuss the literature related to the four 
types of labor mobility studies in the same order as they have been introduced in the 
previous paragraph. 
2.3 Classical Competitive Model of Labor Mobility 
The literature relating to the classical competitive model of labor mobility 
assumes a simple linear regression model wherein net migration is dependent upon the 
wage differential between two countries or areas being analyzed.  More generally, the 
classical competitive model of labor mobility assumes that full employment exists and 
that labor reallocates itself in response to market needs.  According to P. Neal Ritchey 
(1976), there are four assumptions underlying the classical competition model: 1) people 
maximize utility as a function of leisure and real income, 2) people have perfect 
knowledge about employment opportunities, 3) there are many workers in the labor 
market and they have homogeneous skills and tastes, and 4) there are no barriers to labor 
mobility.17 
 If these assumptions hold, then labor demand and labor supply are always seeking 
equilibrium, with supply adjusting in response to differing relative real-wage rates 
between areas.  In other words, assuming a perfectly competitive labor market, the 
existence of a wage differential between areas causes labor supply to migrate, and in fact, 
that the volume of migration increases as the wage differential increases.  This 
relationship between wages and labor supply is seen in the following set of equations, 
where ),( lcu  is a worker’s utility from consumption,c , and leisure, LLl -= , which is 
                                                          
17 P. Neal Ritchey, “Explanations of Migration,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 2: 363-404, 1976. 
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the difference between the time available, L , and the labor, L .  Individuals earn wages, 
w , which provides income, I , for consuming at price level p .  Non-labor income, m , 
provides additional funds for consumption. 
LLllcu -=   where,),(max  
LwIpcmI *==+    where, such that  
Further, 
lLL -= , 
such that the constraint can be re-written as 
pcmlLw =+- )( . 
The Lagrangian for the utility maximization problem is 
)(),(  mwlLwpclcu -+--= lL , 
where l is the Lagrange multiplier.  Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to wage 
provides the following first-order condition. 
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This implies that utility is decreasing as wage rises, because the opportunity cost of 
leisure is increasing.  Therefore, a utility maximizing individual will supply more labor 
into the market with the higher wage.  Aronsson, et al (2001) find support for this theory 
when analyzing Swedish migration from 1970 to 1995.  They conclude that regions with 
higher initial levels of average income have a lower growth rate of income that regions 
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with low initial levels, and that the convergence is partly due to labor mobility between 
regions.18 
 Literature on findings related to the classical competitive model is vast.  Authors 
use nominal measures of earnings or income to test and prove the hypothesis of an 
implied positive relation with net migration.  As historical examples, Ritchey (1976) cites 
studies conducted by Courchene (1970), Greenwood and Gormely (1971), Tarver and 
Gurley (1965), Bass and Alexander (1972), and Raymond (1972).  Ritchey (1976) also 
sites others (Sommers and Suits, 1973; Cebula and Vedder, 1973) who find a positive 
association between net migration and per capita income.  More recently, Parikh and Van 
Leuvensteijn (2003) identify higher rates of migration in white-collar workers than in 
blue-collar workers, due to larger wage differentials between German regions for white-
collar workers.19  They go on to say that migration occurs more rapidly when the 
convergence of wage differentials is slow, because the opportunity cost of migrating is 
lower than when convergence is rapid.20  In other words, if the wage differential persists 
for a long period of time, then utility maximizing individuals will choose migration.  
Juarez (2000) also finds a positive relationship between income and immigration when 
analyzing gross migration flows between 17 Spanish regions from 1963 through 1993.  
He concludes, “People prefer to search for jobs in those regions where wages are growing 
at a relatively higher rate.”21  These studies support the conclusion that the association is 
negative between out-migration and earnings, and positive between in-migration and 
                                                          
18 Thomas Aronsson, Johan Lundberg, and Magnus Wirstrom, “Regional Income Growth and Net 
Migration in Sweden, 1970-1995,” Regional Studies, Vol 35, no 9: 823-830, 2001. 
19 Ashok Parikh and Michiel Van Leuvensteijn, “Interregional Labour Mobility, Inequality, and Wage 
Convergence,” Applied Economics, Vol 35: 931-941, 2003. 
20 Ibid. 
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earnings.  This implies that net migration should be strongly positive in relation to 
earnings level, or real wage level, depending on which measure is used. 
 However, there are many examples in the literature of inconclusive or even 
opposite results.  While Beals, Levy, and Moses (1967) find clear evidence of migrants 
moving to areas with high wage levels in Ghana, Iden and Richter (1971) find no 
association between in-migration or out-migration and earnings when studying areas of 
the Atlantic coastal plains. 22  As discussed in Ritchey (1976) Rutman (1970) finds no 
association between migration and the percentage of the population with high incomes in 
studying West Virginian counties, and Trott (1971) finds that out-migration decreases as 
earnings level of selected areas increases. 23  Similarly, in their study of Chinese cities 
from 1995 to 1999, Chen and Coulson (2002) find that “per capital wage level (salary) 
exerts no significant influence on migration” and that “migrants do not simply flock to 
cities for higher wages.”24  
Common explanations for these contradictory results are plentiful.  Lianos (1970, 
1972) explains that a positive wage differential creates a stock of migrants, while those 
achieving migration are considered to be the flow of migrants. 25  This approach of 
distinguishing between the stock and the flow differs from most studies that assume the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 Juan Pablo Juarez, “Analysis of Interregional Labor Migration in Spain Using Gross Flows,” Journal of 
Regional Science, Vol 40, no 2: 377-399, 2000. 
22 R.E. Beals, M.B. Levy, and L.N. Moses, “Rationality and Migration in Ghana,” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol 49: 480-486, 1967.  G. Iden and C. Richter, “Factors Associated with 
Population Mobility in the Atlantic Coastal Plains Region,” Land Economics, Vol 47: 189-193, 1971. 
23 G.L. Rutman, “Migration and Economic Opportunities in West Virginia: A Statistical Analysis,” Rural 
Society, Vol 35: 206-217, 1970.  C.E. Trott, “Differential Responses in the Decision to Migrate,” Regional 
Science Association, Vol 28: 203-219, 1971. 
24 Aimin Chen and N. Edward Coulson, “Determinants of Urban Migration: Evidence from Chinese 
Cities,” Urban Studies, Vol 39, no 12: 2189-2197, 2002. 
25 T.P. Lianos, “A Stocks and Flows Approach to Migration,” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol 52: 422-443, 1970. T.P. Lianos, “The Migration Process and Time Lags,” Journal of 
Regional Science, Vol 12: 425-433, 1972. 
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two must be equal at the time of observation.  If the stock and flow are assumed to be 
equal, when they actually are not, then migration may be over or under-stated, leading to 
inconsistent results.  O’Rourke (1972) further explains this distinction in stating, 
“earnings differentials between countries and regions generates a stock of migrants.  As a 
result of institutional barriers, personal inertia, and incomplete knowledge, not all of the 
existing stock becomes a flow of migrants. 26  Lianos and O’Rourke conclude that, in 
reality, there may be a difference between the stock and the flow due to response lags.   
Thus far, the literature cited has assumed a perfectly competitive model of labor 
mobility.  However, reality often exists outside the realm of perfect competition.  
Commonly cited deviations from the perfectly competitive model include differences in 
an individual’s personal characteristics such as race, age, education, and family size, or 
differences in the distance of migration, and whether the migration is voluntary or 
involuntary.  These considerations draw the analysis away from the classical competitive 
model of labor mobility toward the investment in human capital model, which 
incorporates such variables and differences between individuals.  The literature 
surrounding this model is summarized below. 
2.4 Investment in Human Capital Model of Labor Mobility 
The literature proposing a non-competitive model of labor mobility is much larger 
than that for the competitive model, due to the number of different factors that must be 
incorporated into a non-competitive environment.  Many of the publications referenced 
below do not specifically explain labor mobility as an investment in human capital 
decision, but define and justify many of the variables of a non-competitive model that 
                                                          
26 D. O’Rourke, “A Stocks and Flows Approach to a Theory of Human Migration with Examples from Past 
Irish Migration,” Demography, Vol 9: 263-274, 1972. 
  29 
 
will later be incorporated into a human capital investment model.  This model compares 
the present value of future benefits from migration to the costs associated with migration.  
If the benefits exceed the costs, the individual is expected to migrate.  If the costs exceed 
the benefits, the individual is expected to stay in his or her current location. 
The most common variables of consideration in a non-competitive model include 
age and life-cycle stage, family size and marital status, distance of migration, existing 
unemployment rates, education, and other factors like home ownership, language spoken, 
and whether the migration is voluntary or involuntary.  The literature surrounding these 
variables of consideration will be discussed in detail below.  Following such discussion 
will be an explanation of the investment in human capital model of labor mobility, and 
how this model incorporates many of these variables.   
2.4.1 Age and Life-Cycle Stage 
The labor mobility literature generally reveals that older people are less likely to 
migrate than younger people.  This is because there is a reduction in gains to net earnings 
as individuals age.  The present value of future earnings from migration is dependent 
upon the number of years that the individual will generate earnings from the new higher-
paying job.  For older migrants, there are fewer remaining years of work, which means it 
is more difficult to recoup the costs of migration.   
Another important consideration is the individual’s wage in the current job, 
without migration.  Older people have generally obtained higher levels of human capital 
that are specific to their present employer (assuming longer job tenure is age dependent).  
This means that an older individual, with high job tenure, may be earning a higher wage 
due to job-specific human capital, than he or she could earn elsewhere.  Lowry (1966) 
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finds that U.S. migration rates differ considerably by age, and concludes that out 
migration is greater in areas with larger middle-age populations. 27  Bramhall and Bryce 
(1969) find that out-migration rates differ between age groups, but attribute the 
differences to population size, gender, and ethnicity characteristics of the age groups.28   
Most studies support the conclusion that older people are less likely to migrate because 
benefits are lower and costs are higher than for younger individuals.  However, not all 
studies support this conclusion.  In his analysis of married men and women in the 
Netherlands from 1981 to 1993, Smits (2001) finds that older persons earn more, but also 
migrate more than younger persons.29   
Another factor related to the age of individuals is the cost of moving.  Older 
people are assumed to have higher migration costs, both direct and indirect.  Older people 
have accumulated more possessions, which means the cost of transportation (a direct 
cost) is likely to be higher.  Again, assuming older individuals have longer job tenure, 
these people will experience greater indirect costs of moving, as they have greater loss of 
seniority or pension benefits by leaving their present employer.  In addition, psychic costs 
of moving are expected to rise with age, as older people have generally developed more 
friends and other ties to the community and to work than have younger individuals. 
2.4.2 Family Size and Marital Status 
 Labor mobility literature typically finds that costs of migration multiply as family 
size increases.  Generally, migration rates are found to be higher for single people than 
                                                          
27 Ira S. Lowry, Migration and Metropolitan Growth: Two Analytical Models, San Francisco: Chandler 
Publishing Co., 1966, table 6, p 31. 
28 D. F. Bramhall and H.J. Bryce, “Interstate Migration of Labor-Force Age Populations,” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol 22: 576-583, 1969. 
29 Jeroen Smits, “Career Migration, Self-selection and the Earnings of Married Men and Women in the 
Netherlands, 1981-93,” Urban Studies, Vol 38, no 3: 541-562, 2001. 
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for married people, and for married people with spouses who do not work than with 
spouses who do work.  More specifically, Jacob Mincer (1978) draws four conclusion 
from his research on family migration decisions: 1) unmarried persons are more likely to 
move than married persons, 2) a wife’s employment inhibits family migration, 3) the 
longer a wife’s tenure at her job, the less likely a family will migrate, and 4) the presence 
of school age children generally reduces the tendency to migrate. 30  As an example, 
Smits et al (2003) find that dual-earner couples and families in the Netherlands are less 
likely to migrate than one-earner couples or single individuals.31  Further, they find this 
result to be consistent in 1977 data and 1996 data.  However, when comparing 1977 to 
1996, Smits et al (2003) also find that “over time, individuals have become more 
restricted in their migration possibilities because of the presence of a working partner.”32  
Nilsson (2001) studies Swedish migration from 1985 to 1995 and determines that 
“migration is disadvantageous for women with children, while other groups gained from 
migration.”33  Similarly, Smits (2001) finds that “migration among married persons in the 
Netherlands is a relatively infrequent phenomenon” and that “less than one percent of the 
couples seem to undertake a move on behalf of the career of one of the spouses.”34  
Finally, Ahn et al (1999) find that teens, individuals over 50, and married women are the 
                                                          
30 Jacob Mincer, “Family Migration Decisions,” Journal of Political Economy, October, 1978: 749-774. 
31 Jeroen Smits, Clara H. Mulder, and Pieter Hooimeijer, “Changing Gender Roles, Shifting Power 
Balance, and Long Distance Migration of Couples,” Urban Studies, Vol 40, no 3: 603-613, 2003. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Karina Nilsson, “Migration, Gender, and the Household Structure: Changes in Earnings Among Young 
Adults in Sweden,” Regional Studies, Vol 35, no 6: 499-511, 2001. 
34 Smits, 2001. 
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least willing to move for work, while unmarried young adults are more willing than any 
other group.35 
 Overall, Jacob Mincer’s assumptions are supported in the literature, providing the 
conclusion that married people are less likely to migrate than single people, and 
migration decreases with family size. 
2.4.3 Distance of Migration 
 The probability of migrating varies inversely with the distance a person must 
move.  There are three main reasons for this conclusion. First, as distance of migration 
increases, knowledge of available opportunities in the destination area decreases.  In 
other words, people have less information on labor market opportunities in areas farther 
away from their current location.  Second, transportation costs are directly related to the 
distance of migration.  Third, psychic costs of moving away from friends and family 
increase with distance.   
 However, these assumptions do not hold true in all instances.  Lowry (1966) 
regressed distance, as measured by airline miles, on total migration between two 
metropolitan areas and found that “the variable contributes virtually nothing to the 
explanation.”36  Smits (2001) states that the high material and immaterial costs of a long-
distance move will only be incurred if they are outweighed by the benefits.  He goes on to 
say that those who migrate long distances are a self-selected group who possess other 
characteristics which improve their earning potential after migration.37 
                                                          
35 Namkee Ahn, Sara De La Rica, and Arantza Ugidos, “Willingness to Move for Work and 
Unemployment Duration in Spain,” Economica, Vol 66: 335-357, 1999. 
36 Lowry, 16. 
37 Smits, 2001. 
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2.4.4 Unemployment Rates 
As previously mentioned, full employment is an assumption of the classical 
competitive model of labor mobility.  Therefore, unemployment (or divergence from full 
employment) is another explanation for migration flows.  Unemployment is an indicator 
of “tightness” of the labor market.  In other words, it is a measure of the relative 
probability that jobs are available.  The logical assumption is that high unemployment in 
an area will lead to more out-migration and less in-migration, as workers are “pushed” 
away to an area with better employment probability.  Therefore, unemployment is 
expected to have a positive effect on out-migration. In other words, net migration should 
be negatively related to unemployment.  However, this theoretical assumption faces 
mixed results, in both historical and current literature.   
Rabianski (1971) finds the expected response of migration flows to relative 
unemployment differences between areas, regardless of the worker’s skill level. 38  
Ritchey (1976) explains that Cebula and Vedder (1973) and Sommers and Suits (1973) 
find similar results, while others (Courchene, 1970; Beals, Levy, and Moses, 1967) find 
“outflow directly related to unemployment, but find no relation between rates of in-
migration and unemployment.”39  Further, Pack (1973) finds no significant relationship 
between in- or out-migration and unemployment, both for white and non-white 
populations. 40 
More recently, Pekkala and Tervo (2002) find that unemployed individuals in 
Finland from 1994 to 1996 did move out of regions with high unemployment, but did not 
                                                          
38 J. Rabianski, “Real Earnings and Human Migration,” The Journal of Human Resources, Vol 6: 185-192, 
1971. 
39 Ritchey, 1976. 
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necessarily move to regions with the lowest unemployment rates.41  They go on to say, 
“Moving itself does not improve the chances of re-employment, whereas the relatively 
better observable and unobservable quality of migrants does.”42  In studying German 
regions, Parikh and Van Leuvensteijn (2003) find that “unemployment differences 
between regions or level of unemployment in destination region hardly matters in the 
migrant’s decision-making process.”43  In contrast, Juarez (2000) finds that higher rates 
of unemployment increase out-migration, when studying Spanish interregional labor 
force flows.44 
The inconsistencies related to the unemployment variable should not remove it 
from consideration in modeling explanations of net migration flows.  Rather, it may be 
necessary to include other factors in the consideration.  
One proposed solution is to consider prospective unemployment rather than actual 
unemployment data (Blanco, 1964).  Prospective unemployment is “the annual rate of 
unemployment that would be expected to occur if workers were not able to migrate.  It is 
measured by the difference between the actual rate of change of employment and the 
natural rate of increase of the working age population in an area.” 45  Blanco concludes 
that this prospective unemployment measure explains a large portion of the variance 
found in net migration when studying interstate populations. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
40 J.R. Pack, “Determinants of Migration to Central Cities,” Journal of Regional Science, Vol 13; 249-260, 
1973. 
41 Sari Pekkala and Hannu Tervo, “Unemployment and Migration: Does Moving Help?” Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Vol 104, no 4: 621-639, 2002. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Parikh and Van Leuvensteijn, 2003. 
44 Juarez, 2000. 
45 C. Blanco, “Prospective Unemployment and Interstate Population Movements,” The Review of 
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 Despite some inconsistency in the data, overall, a higher rate of unemployment 
positively affects out-migration, while a lower rate of unemployment positively 
influences in-migration. 
2.4.5 Education 
 Level of education is an important factor in the human capital model of labor 
mobility, and also provides the basis for a plethora of recent studies pertaining to the 
migration of skilled workers.  It is generally assumed that the higher one’s education, all 
else being equal, the more likely it is that he or she will migrate.  Long (1973) finds that 
“men, age 25-29, who went to graduate school are three times as likely to move between 
states during a year’s time as men who did not finish high school.”46  In a study of 
Swedish net migration, Aronsson et al (2001) conclude that the “the initial endowment of 
human capital (as measured by the percentage of the population with a degree from 
higher education) tends to increase the net migration rate.”47  Similarly, Ahn et al (1999) 
conclude that migration willingness increases with education level.48   
There are several plausible explanations for the positive relationship between 
education and emigration.  One explanation is that “college graduates and those with 
postgraduate training tend to search for employment in regional and national labor 
markets in which employers seek qualified employees.”49  A related explanation is that 
there exists a greater potential for economic gain from migration because of regional 
variation in returns to schooling.  In other words, some areas experience higher average 
                                                          
46 Larry H. Long, “Migration Differentials by Education and Occupation: Trends and Variations,” 
Demography, May 1973: 245. 
47 Aronsson et al, 2001. 
48 Ahn et al, 1999. 
49 Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue and David A. Macpherson, Contemporary 
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pay rates for highly educated workers than other areas.  The general assumption is that 
the highly educated are aware of these opportunities and have skills that are in demand in 
these areas; therefore, they are more likely to attain higher wage rates than their less 
educated cohorts, due to migration.   
Another explanation for higher migration rates among the highly educated is that 
college educated workers face a greater likelihood of being transferred to other areas, 
either due to job placement programs offered in college or because they are employed 
with more national and international companies.  Yet another explanation for the direct 
relationship between education and migration is that people with college degrees may 
experience fewer psychic costs from migration, because they have already experienced 
migration when leaving home for college.  A related explanation is that individuals who 
leave home to attend college in the first place are people with “lower innate psychic costs 
and stronger preferences for migration.”50  Although the direction of the causation is 
unclear, the overall result is the same.  People who move once are more likely to move 
again, either because their personalities are more prone toward migration, or because they 
have adjusted to and become comfortable with migration. 
These various explanations of migration behavior by highly educated workers 
have been incorporated into many recent brain drain studies.  The term “brain drain” is 
used to describe the loss of intellectual and human capital due to the emigration of highly 
skilled workers.  The following section provides a summary of recent brain drain 
literature, including policy recommendations and implications. 
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2.4.5.1 Brain Drain Literature 
 Education has long been considered a factor that influences an individual’s 
migration behavior.  However, studies of the impact on cities, states, and countries due to 
the emigration of skilled labor, commonly referred to as brain drain, have only come to 
the forefront of economic and sociological literature in recent years.  In a 1994 
publication, Vladimir Shkolnikov analyzes the potential impact on Russian science due to 
the emigration of an estimated 7,500 to 9,000 physicists and mathematician.  He 
expresses great concern in stating, “If able younger scientists leave Russia, their older 
colleagues would have fewer talented people to whom they can pass their knowledge.  
This could lead to a decline in the quality of research in those scientific disciplines where 
Russia is currently ranked high internationally.”51  In another recent study, author Scott 
Fuess states “economic globalization is resulting in an increasingly integrated global 
labor market, especially for highly skilled specialists.”52  He goes on to explain that the 
shortage of skilled workers in Japan led to amended immigration policies in the 1990s 
designed to increase the flow of migrants from abroad, in hopes of preventing a loss of 
intellectual superiority.  In a more recent study of migration in Spain (Mauro and 
Spilimbergo, 1994), the authors explain, “the opportunity cost of not working is typically 
higher for the highly skilled.  Therefore, in response to a job loss…the highly skilled are 
more likely than the low-skilled workers to migrate rather than remaining unemployed or 
dropping out of the labor force.”53  This study goes on to show that highly skilled 
                                                          
51 Vladimir D. Shkolnikov, Scientific Bodies in Motion:  The Domestic and International Consequences of 
the Current and Emergent Brain Drain from the Former USSR,” 1994. 
52 Scott M. Fuess, “Immigration Policy and Highly Skilled Workers: The Case of Japan,” Contemporary 
Economic Policy, Vol 21, no2: 243-257, April 2003. 
53 Paolo Mauro and Antonio Spilimbergo, “How Do the Skilled and the Unskilled Respond to Regional 
Shocks? The Case of Spain,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol 46, no1: 1-17, March 1999. 
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workers in Spain migrate much more quickly than low skilled workers when faced with a 
decline in regional labor demand. 
 The extensive brain drain literature is not exclusive to studies of specific 
countries.  Another recent publication (Huang et al, 2002) determines that the brain drain 
from rural areas to urban areas is the result of higher returns to human capital in the urban 
areas, and concludes that the younger working-age population is most sensitive to 
economic incentives to move.54  Bucovetsky (2003) finds that “there are productivity 
differences between regions, and that emigration of the most skilled workers from less 
productive regions increases the overall value of national output.”55  He goes on to 
explain that the less-skilled workers left behind are in low-productivity regions, the 
combination of which hinders growth of less-developed nations. 
However, not all brain drain studies find a negative impact on the departure 
country.  Davis and Weinstein (2002) find that the United States experiences high inflow 
of both skilled and unskilled workers because of US technological superiority.  They 
determine that “a country that experiences immigration of factors motivated by 
technological differences always loses from this migration…while the other country 
gains.”56  The reason for this conclusion is that a surplus of immigrants in a country will 
result in a decrease in the marginal productivity of each worker, which reduces the value 
of all similarly skilled labor in the destination location.  Davis and Weinstein find that the 
negative impact is greater for skilled labor than for unskilled labor. 
                                                          
54 Tzu-Ling Haung, Peter F. Orazem, and Darin Wohlgemuth, “Rural Population Growth, 1950-1990: The 
Roles of Human Capital, Industry Structure, and Government Policy,” American Journal of Agricultural 
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55 S. Bucovetsky, “Efficient Migration and Redistribution,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol 87:2459-
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Clearly the topic of skilled worker migration has flooded the literature in recent 
years.  In addition to studies of the migrant flows, and the consequences facing the 
departure and destination locations, many studies analyze and recommend policies to 
prevent brain drain. 
2.4.5.2 Preventing Brain Drain 
 Government policies to prevent emigration and encourage immigration of skilled 
workers, range from tax incentives to quotas to subsidies, and may be imposed on the 
migrant, the hiring company, or the country.   As previously mentioned, Japanese 
immigration policy experienced drastic changes throughout the 1990s.  The Japanese 
labor market has historically been closed to foreigners through the Immigration-Control 
and Refugee-Recognition Act (ICRRA), which restricts the flow of immigrants.  
However, in response to a shortage of skilled labor in the 1990s, the government 
loosened restrictions, making it easier for foreign professionals to live and work in the 
country.  Fuess (2003) studied the effect of this policy change and determined that the 
inflow of foreign specialists into Japan doubled immediately after the policy change.  He 
states, “It continued to expand throughout the 1990s despite Japan’s slumping economy.  
Inflows increased especially rapidly for engineers and international specialists.”57  Mauro 
and Spilimbergo (1999) find that unemployment compensation programs impact skilled 
and unskilled workers differently.  Generous unemployment compensation programs in 
the origin location will deter emigration of unskilled workers, but not impact skilled 
workers.  However, low unemployment compensation programs provide similar 
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incentives to migrate for both skilled and unskilled labor.58  When studying subsidies to 
prevent rural emigration, Huang et al (2002) find that “efforts to spur expansion of one or 
two sectors may weaken rather than strengthen the rural labor market.  Rather than pick 
targeted sectors for subsidy, funds are better spent expanding the range of industries 
within commuting distance.”59  In other words, growth of new industry and improved 
transportation (infrastructure) may be more effective in reducing emigration that simply 
providing money to expand existing industries. 
 In a recent study of South African skilled labor shortage, the authors criticize the 
government’s policy of penalizing businesses for hiring external workers (Wöcke and 
Klein, 2002).  While the intention of the policy was to insure that high skill jobs were 
available to domestic labor, the downside is that few skilled workers come into the 
country, which reduces the flow of knowledge and hurts economic growth.  In fact, 
Wöcke and Klein argue that skilled workers generally create jobs for unskilled workers, 
in part because foreign investment flows toward skilled industry.60  By reducing the 
inflow of skilled workers, South African economic growth is hindered. 
 The most direct method of controlling migration is a quota system, whereby 
countries place an upper limit on the number of immigrants they will accept.  A recent 
study by Myers and Papageorgiou (2002) compares the quota methodology to a taxation-
subsidy methodology, wherein migrants “pay an entrance price for their right of 
citizenship.”61  The authors find that the taxation-subsidy method is more efficient at 
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controlling immigration than the quota method, but that global output and efficiency is 
hindered through both programs.  Therefore, an open-border migration policy will 
provide the greatest benefit to global production levels.  Similarly, in studying income tax 
structures and income redistribution policies in different regions, Bucovetsky (2003) 
concludes that transferring income from rich regions to poor regions will impede 
migration.  He goes on to say, “Everyone will gain from the reduction in barriers to 
mobility, if some higher level of government can transfer income between the destination 
and source regions of the migration.”62   
 In summary, the best migration policy to prevent brain drain may be to remove 
the migration barriers, but create an economic infrastructure will pulls workers to areas 
where they are most needed, and will be most productive.  Perhaps more pertinent to the 
current study, Mahroum (2000) finds that the migration of scientists is most effected by 
developments in academia and science, leading to the conclusion that government 
policies toward research and infrastructure will prevent emigration and encourage 
immigration.63 
2.4.6 Other Factors 
Ritchey (1076) discusses an additional explanation for migration, as explained by 
Galloway (1967, 1969): “Involuntary mobility may obscure the empirical association 
between migration flows and wage differences.” 64  Ritchey points out that workers who 
have been laid-off or fired from their jobs are under greater pressure to find work than 
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those who quit voluntarily.  In addition, these workers may have less market information 
and might be less competitive than workers who voluntarily leave a job to migrate to 
another area. 
Since involuntarily unemployed workers may not be as aware of labor market 
opportunities in other areas as those who left a job voluntarily, it is questionable whether 
or not these workers will have the knowledge base to move to areas of low 
unemployment in search of jobs.  Even if they do, they may not have the knowledge 
necessary to find employment immediately, creating a higher unemployment rate in the 
destination location.  As previously explained, areas of higher unemployment have 
“tighter” job markets, with less probability of employment than areas with lower 
unemployment rates.   
Another concern is that the unemployed worker may be inclined to take the first 
job available to him or her, rather than prolong the period of unemployment, resulting in 
a lower than desired future stream of earnings.  If this lower stream of earnings means 
that the costs of migration were in fact greater than the benefits gained, then the worker 
never should have migrated in the first place.  However, while studying migration 
willingness of Spanish populations, Ahn et al (1999) find that migration willingness does 
not change with the duration of unemployment, which indicates that job search behavior 
and acceptance will not differ among those who have been unemployed for different 
lengths of time.65 
Additional factors that influence migration decisions include such factors as home 
ownership, occupational licensure, public assistance programs, and union membership, to 
                                                          
65 Ahn et al, 1999. 
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name a few.  Some of these factors are incorporated into the investment in human capital 
model, while others are more related to the residential satisfaction studies that will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter.   
Still other explanations for migration can be found.  Lowry (1966) concludes, 
“Places experiencing prosperity generally have labor market conditions which attract in-
migrants.”66  Pursell (1972) finds that out-migration increases as the number of new 
entrants into the labor force increases, while in-migration decreases in response to an 
increase in the number of new entrants into the labor force. 67  Lastly, Fabricant (1970) 
determines that migration occurs because of a labor demand gap, which exists when there 
is a greater demand for labor in the destination location than in the originating location.  
He goes on to explain that “the larger the expected excess demand gap between the j and 
i  regions, the more migration will occur from i to j.68 
Despite which variables, or group of variables, are considered, the investment in 
human capital model can be used to predict the migration decisions of individuals based 
on the costs and benefits associated with such variables. 
2.5 Investment in Human Capital: Mathematical Model 
Human capital is increased through investment, which often requires current 
sacrifices in exchange for future benefits.  Migration is a type of human capital 
investment involving a current sacrifice in exchange for a higher future stream of 
earnings.  An individual will choose to migrate if the following inequality exists. 
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The net present value of future benefits of migration, Vp, based on the discount 
rate, i, is calculated as the difference between the earnings from the new job, E2, and the 
earnings from the existing job, E1, over the remaining years of work, N.  If this value is 
greater than the direct and indirect monetary costs of migration, C, plus the net psychic 
costs of the move, Z, then the individual will migrate.  Transportation cost is generally 
considered a direct cost of migration, while forgone income during the move is an 
indirect cost.  Additional indirect costs include the loss of seniority or pension benefits 
that may be available at the existing job.  Psychic costs of moving are related to the loss 
that one experiences by moving away from friends or family, and are also included as 
indirect costs associated with migration. 
 Many of the variables discussed in section 2.4 can be incorporated into the 
investment in human capital model.  A brief analysis follows for each of these variables 
as they relates to this model.   
2.5.1 Age and Life-Cycle Stage: Impact on the Model 
Older individuals have fewer years over which to generate future earnings than 
younger individuals.  In addition, job tenure is directly related to age, which implies that 
indirect costs of leaving the existing job are expected to rise with age.  Similarly, psychic 
costs of moving away from family and friends are generally higher for older individuals. 
Therefore, both direct and indirect costs are expected to increase with age, while 
future benefits from migration are expected to decrease with age.  Consequently, the 
present value of future benefits of migration is expected to be lower for older individuals. 
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2.5.2 Family Size and Marital Status: Impact on the Model 
 In this model we can see that both direct and indirect costs of migration will rise 
with family size.  Direct transportation costs of migration are lower for single individuals 
than for those who are married, and indirect or psychic costs are generally also lower for 
single individuals.   
For those who are married, migration costs may rise or fall depending on the 
employment status of the spouse.  Those with working spouses may experience higher 
costs due to the loss of income of the spouse during the move, but may also have greater 
ability to bear the cost burden of the move due to higher household income levels.  Those 
individuals with unemployed spouses may experience lower costs of migration because 
the spouse is able to handle the details of the move itself, including time spent finding a 
new home and energy and effort toward packing and unpacking the house.  However, this 
couple may be less able to bear the expense of the move with only one household 
income.   
2.5.3 Distance of Migration: Impact on the Model 
 As distance of migration increases, the actual cost of transportation of oneself and 
one’s belongings will rise.  In addition, the indirect and psychic costs of leaving 
neighborhood, friends, and family members rises with distance.   
In addition, knowledge of available job opportunities is expected to decrease as 
distance increases, which means individuals migrating long distances may have more 
difficulty becoming re-employed, or may not be able to obtain the earnings that he or she 
expected prior to the migration decision. 
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2.5.4 Unemployment Rates: Impact on the Model 
 In relation to the investment in human capital model of labor mobility, the 
unemployment rate in the destination area is an indicator of the likelihood of obtaining 
new employment.  This variable should be incorporated into the expected present value 
of future benefits portion of the equation, since those future benefits will only result if 
employment is achieved in the destination area. 
2.5.5 Education: Impact on the Model 
 Individuals with higher levels of education are more knowledgeable of job 
opportunities and wages in other areas.  The result is lower indirect costs of migration as 
these individuals are likely to be out of work for shorter periods of time during the 
migration process.  Further, individuals who have previously migrated to attend college 
are more likely to migrate again; once a migrator, always a migrator.  This implies lower 
psychic costs of migration, as these individuals are less prone to high neighborhood 
attachment. 
2.5.6 Other Variables: Impact on the Model 
 Home ownership can be incorporated into this model because the time, energy, 
and expense associated with selling one’s home prior to migration is expected to increase 
the cost of migration.  Occupational licensure may increase or decrease the costs of 
migration.  If licensure in one state does not transfer to another state, then the individual 
may be burdened with the cost of re-testing and/or re-licensing in the new location.  This 
could increase the indirect costs of the move, both in terms of lost income during the 
process and in terms of the actual cost of the license.  However, in some instances, 
licensure may practically guarantee employment in the destination area, thus reducing the 
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indirect cost of migration by minimizing the amount of time out of work and the 
necessary job search. 
 Other variables can also be incorporated into the investment in human capital 
model of labor mobility, simply by considering whether the variable of interest is likely 
to impact the costs or benefits associated with the migration decision.  Analysis of 
additional variables is left to the reader such that we can proceed to another type of labor 
mobility study. 
2.6 Residential Preference and Satisfaction Models of Labor Mobility 
 Although not as plentiful as classical competitive and human capital models of 
labor mobility, residential preference and satisfaction analyses are readily available in 
sociology literature pertaining to migration decisions.  These studies focus on the 
conditions of the areas of migration and the individual’s satisfaction with those areas.  In 
this type of model the migration decision involves weighing the positive and negative 
factors at the origin and destination locations, then making a decision to migrate or not 
migrate based on the values perceived in each area.  The general framework is the “Push-
pull Model” developed by Everett S. Lee (1966).  This model posits that the decision to 
migrate includes not only considerations of positive and negative factors at the sender 
and receiver areas, but also intervening obstacles and personal factors. 69  The intervening 
obstacles and personal factors facing an individual may influence his or her perception of 
the attractiveness of the origin area and the desirability of alternative locations.  
Perceptions play a very important role in the residential preference and satisfaction of 
individuals.  Differing perceptions and preferences will result in individuals making 
migration decisions at different times and for different reasons. 
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 A related work in this area of study deals with the “implications of locational 
decisions by individuals and groups under strain which has been caused by noxious 
environmental forces.”70  In this study, Wolpert (1966) relates positive forces to 
environmental amenities and stressors to environmental disamenities.  She claims that 
“noxious environmental influences” place strain upon individuals, which induces them to 
consider migration in order to reduce the strain.  She further finds that individuals 
undergoing a change in status or experiencing other disharmony in their lives will be 
more impacted by environmental disamenities and have a lower strain/stress threshold.  
These individuals will attempt to minimize exposure to the noxious elements or 
disamenities by making a decision to migrate to an area of higher expected positive 
factors.  In other words, Wolpert introduces the idea that individuals make a decision to 
migrate once a stress threshold has been achieved, and explains that this threshold will 
differ for individuals based on other mitigating factors in their personal, career, or social 
environments. 
The “noxious” environmental factors in Wolpert’s analysis differ from those that 
are explained in more recent publications.  Wolpert (1966), and previously Lee (1966), 
claim that traffic congestion, air and water pollution, lawlessness, lack of open spaces, 
noise levels, and the like, are the most common negative factors that encourage 
individuals to consider migration.  Clearly, at the time of these publications, the biggest 
migration concerns for families were pollution and congestion, which have since become 
commonplace in urban areas.  More recently, the concerns for families when choosing a 
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residence include such factors as safety of schools, nearness to relatives, neighborhood 
social interactions, size and spaciousness of the home, and economic growth in the 
residential area.  In a recent study of urban cities, Berry Cullen and Levitt (1999) state, 
“Each additional reported crime is associated with a roughly one-person decline in city 
population.”71  They go on to explain that nearly all crime related population decline is 
due to an increase in out-migration, rather than a decrease in in-migration.72 
Despite the possible change in variables of consideration over time, the 
underlying analysis remains the same.  Individuals and families constantly evaluate their 
residential satisfaction levels and make a decision to consider migration if some pre-
determined acceptable level of stress has been surpassed.  Reaching a threshold to begin 
considering migration does not necessarily imply that migration will occur.  When 
studying Thailand migration from 1992 and 1994, De Jong (2000) finds that intentions of 
migration are a statistically significant predictor of permanent migration, but not of 
temporary migration.73 
Speare (1974) further examines this idea of a residential stress threshold or strain 
level.  He finds that the stress threshold for a family or for an individual is determined by 
the age of the head of household, the duration of residence at the current location, 
whether or not the individual is a homeowner, and the extent of room crowding in the 
current living environment.74   Speare states “members of individual households can be 
viewed as tied to a particular location by bonds to other individuals, attachment to the 
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particular housing unit, attachment to a job, attachment to a neighborhood-based 
organization or other local bonds.”75  He claims that the strength of these bonds will 
determine the level of satisfaction of an individual.  The higher the satisfaction, the less 
likely the person will be to migrate.  Dissatisfaction can arise from a change in household 
needs, social and physical amenities, or a change in the standards used to evaluate 
residential satisfaction.  Regardless of the cause, Speare concludes, “Once a threshold for 
dissatisfaction has been passed, a person will search for alternatives and will evaluate 
these alternatives relative to his or her current location.”76  Speare acknowledges that 
involuntary moves through eviction, job transfer, divorce, and the like will force the 
individual to search for alternatives without necessarily having reached the threshold for 
dissatisfaction, and therefore cannot be considered in the analysis. 
 As discussed in Ritchey (1976), Sonnenfeld (1974) adds to the residential 
satisfaction literature by finding that “migration intentions are inversely related to the 
perceived attractiveness of one’s home community.”77  Ritchey (1976) also discusses 
research conducted by White (1974), who finds a “direct relationship between in-
migration and aggregate residential preference value attributed to the cities by potential 
migrants.”78  In other words, individuals considering migration will compare the expected 
residential satisfaction at the destination location to the perceived satisfaction at the 
current residence whenever faced with a migration decision. 
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 Residential satisfaction models have faced criticism in recent publications (Lee, 
Oropesa, and Kanan, 1994; Landale and Guest, 1985) for not incorporating the traditional 
“structural” variables of labor mobility.  These authors attempt to correct for the omission 
by creating regression models that incorporate the residential stress and community 
attachment variables into traditional models of migration that include individual status 
variables such as age, education, and job tenure.  They generally conclude that the 
subjective features of neighborhoods not only influence individuals in making a decision 
to consider migration, but also indirectly aid the decision on whether to move or stay.  
Lee, Oropesa, and Kanan (1994) conclude that being older, being a homeowner, and 
being a longtime resident reduce the chance of moving, and that these factors not only 
influence thoughts about migration but actually influence movement directly.  
Additionally, they find that “how urbanites view and experience their neighborhood may 
indirectly determine whether they move or stay put.” 79  Similarly, Landale and Guest 
(1985) conclude that residential “satisfaction is a strong predictor of thoughts about 
moving, and that thoughts about moving are good predictors of actual mobility.”80  
However, they find that satisfaction is not a good direct predictor of mobility, and that the 
traditional structural variables of labor mobility studies are better predictors of actual 
mobility.  In other words, although residential satisfaction and preference factors may 
encourage or discourage thoughts of mobility, they are not sufficient predictors of who 
will migrate and who will stay.   
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This conclusion brings the literature on residential satisfaction full-circle, back to 
the original conclusions drawn by Wolpert (1966) and Speare (1974); when individuals 
reach a certain stress or strain level, they will consider migration, and to Lee (1966); 
individuals consider environmental factors in making migration decisions. 
In summary, the aforementioned studies focus on residential satisfaction and 
neighborhood attachment as indicators of mobility.  They postulate that there exists a 
stress threshold below which individuals will not consider migration.  However, once this 
threshold is reached, as measured by personal perceptions and residential characteristics, 
an individual will make the decision to contemplate migration.  It is at this point that the 
competitive model and human capital model enter into consideration, aiding a person in 
determining whether or not to undertake the move, and where to move.  In addition, there 
is evidence that residential satisfaction variables may indirectly influence the actual 
migration decision. 
2.7 Capital-Labor Models of Mobility 
 Like the classical competitive model of labor mobility, introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter, capital-labor mobility models focus on the migration of labor in 
response to wage differentials between areas.  The distinction between the two models is 
that the capital-labor mobility model does not assume that capital is constant or 
homogeneous across areas of consideration.  Rather, the capital-labor mobility studies 
consider the effects on wages and migration due to differences in existing economic 
capital, ability to obtain capital, and capital growth.  However, Aronsson et al (2001) 
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state that capital mobility between regions will make them more homogeneous over time, 
which helps to explain the convergence of wages due to labor mobility.81 
 Some studies (Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-I-Martin, 1995) focus not on the 
existence of physical capital, but on the financial capital accessible to an economy.82  
These studies aim to explain mobility of financial capital between countries and the 
accessibility of that capital to entrepreneurs.  Although this is an interesting and pertinent 
component of capital growth, it will not be discussed further at this point, but is left to 
future research endeavors.  Rather, the remainder of this section will focus on the direct 
relationship between physical capital and labor migration.   
The long-run demand for labor is a derived demand, dependent upon the demand 
for the products or services that the labor produces.  A firm’s production, Q, is a function 
of labor, L, and capital, K, as follows. 
Q = f(L, K) 
Based on the law of diminishing marginal productivity, the marginal product of labor, 
MPL, is negative. 
L
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Further, the firm’s total revenue is determined by the production level and the output 
price, p, 
R = f(L,K) *  p, 
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and marginal revenue product of labor is found by taking first order conditions, with 
respect to labor. 
p
L
KLf
MRPL *¶
¶
=
),(
 
Substituting for MPL yields 
0      <*= pMPMRP LL , 
which shows that the additional gains to revenue from each additional unit of labor 
employed will be negative.  Hence, the demand for labor is a downward sloping 
(negative) derived demand. 
This conclusion is significant when analyzing the interaction between labor and 
capital.  The capital-skill complementarity hypothesis states that unskilled labor and 
capital are substitutes in production, while skilled labor and capital are complements in 
production.83  This implies that investments in physical capital will have differing 
impacts on different groups of workers.  Assuming a population of skilled workers, the 
capital-skill complementarity hypothesis implies that investing in physical capital will 
increase the labor demand because of the complementary relationship between these two 
inputs into the production process.  It therefore follows that destruction of, or decreased 
investment in, physical capital will result in a decrease in the demand for skilled labor. 
 Similar results can be found by reconsidering the law of diminishing marginal 
returns in combination with the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis.  As the amount 
of skilled labor increases, cetaris parabus, each additional worker has a progressively 
smaller share of capital stock, which results in progressively smaller gains to output.  It 
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follows that as the capital stock in an economy shrinks, the marginal productivity of 
skilled labor will fall in the short run, which will reduce the demand for skilled labor, 
such that the complementarity ratio will re-equilibrate.  In other words, in both the short 
and long run, there will be decreased demand for skilled workers as capital stock 
decreases.  These newly unemployed, skilled workers, will migrate to areas with larger 
capital stock or greater possibility of future capital investment in order to become re-
employed. 
 Many studies find that labor migrates in response to of capital flows.  Djajic 
(1989) finds clear evidence that an increase in capital in a country tends to draw labor 
toward that country, and that workers move to areas of higher productivity from areas of 
lower productivity.84  Lucas (1983) draws similar conclusions.  He reasons that 
emigration results in more land and domestic equipment per unit of labor, which implies 
that the marginal productivity of workers will rise.85  In other words, when capital (e.g. 
land and domestic equipment) is scarce, workers improve their economic position by 
emigrating to areas with higher capital stock, resulting in higher productivity and higher 
wage rates.  A similar conclusion is drawn from research by Baldwin and Venables 
(1994).  They determine that high levels of emigration by skilled workers will reduce 
capital inflow into an economy, which creates pessimistic expectations of the economy’s 
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future, resulting in increased emigration.86  They describe this as the “vicious” path and 
propose that governments facing this situation have a clear incentive to take action to 
reduce or delete this cycle, either by encouraging capital inflow or discouraging the 
outflow of skilled workers.  More specifically, Baldwin and Venebles (1994) state, “if 
there is a complementarity between factors, then outflow of one factor reduces the 
incentive for inflow of another.”87  In other words, a reduction of capital in an economy, 
either due to outflow or destruction, will reduce the incentive for immigration into that 
economy, and even encourage emigration. 
 In summary, a decrease in capital stock in an economy increases the incentive for 
out-migration.  Reverse reasoning implies that increasing available capital in an economy 
will increase the marginal productivity of labor, which increases the demand for labor, 
resulting in higher wages and increased in-migration. 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter has provided an introduction and analysis of four main types of labor 
mobility models studied in economic and sociology literature.  The classical competitive 
model assumes that unrestricted movement of workers between regions will result in 
long-run equilibrium wages.  The investment in human capital model states that labor 
will migrate if the present value of future benefits of migration exceeds the costs 
associated with migrating.  The residential satisfaction model assumes that neighborhood 
and societal characteristics are solely responsible for bringing individuals to consider 
migration, and have an indirect effect on the chosen destination.  Finally, the capital-labor 
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model states that labor will migrate in direct response to the flow of capital between 
economies.   
Migration policy recommendations will differ depending upon the economy in 
question and the type of model employed.  This complicated situation is well summarized 
by author John Salt (1992) in an article from the International Migration Review. 
“There is not clear agreement on the best assistance strategies to prevent 
emigration.  Most stress the development of growth centers in rural areas 
in order to prevent excess pressure on the economies of established cities.  
Measures include the establishment of small- and medium-sized 
businesses, combined with the development of occupational skills, 
physical infrastructure, social services and financial services.  Other 
strategic elements include improved terms of trade for exports, reduced 
costs of borrowing, and better planning and disbursement of aid through 
improved local government decision-making. …  Some aid strategies 
emphasize the importance of developing labor-intensive activities. … 
Attempts to counter emigration pressures through development assistance 
must grapple with the notion that migration is a complex process rather 
than a problem.”88 
 
 Many of these measures mentioned by Salt (1992) will be pertinent in discussion 
of policy throughout the remainder of this dissertation, which will focus on the current 
situation facing a transitional Russian economy, concerned with downsizing its vast 
military establishment.  The following chapters will provide an analysis of migration 
behavior in different regions and territories of the Russian Federation, determine the 
differing characteristics of the closed nuclear cities from which proliferation of 
knowledge is a threat, and recommend international government policies to reduce the 
incentives for migration and proliferation of weapons knowledge from Russia and these 
facilities.   
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Predictions and Modeling 
 
3.1 Overview 
 The migration behaviors and influences discussed in chapter 2 were based on a 
number of studies conducted by various researchers.  Chapter 3 is devoted to developing 
a theoretical model of migration behavior.  This model describes the likely effect of 
several factors on the decision to migrate.  If the model correctly specifies this decision, 
then it can be used to anticipate patterns of migration in to and out of the regions in 
question.   
3.2 Modeling Labor Migration 
Recall from chapter 2 that supply labor is determined by utility maximizing 
workers, based on consumption and labor preferences, and subject to prevailing market 
prices and wages.  These same utility maximizing workers will make migration decisions 
by comparing the level of satisfaction received in different locations, dependent upon the 
costs incurred.  An individual, i, wishes to maximizes consumption of a vector of goods 
and services, x , a vector of residential factors, r , and leisure, LLl -=  (defined in 
chapter 2), such that income, I, and non-labor earnings, m, will exceed or equal the cost 
of consumption at current prices, p, and the cost of migration, C. 
( )lrxui ,,max   
move if 
stay if  0
     ,              such that 
C
CCpxmI i =+³+  
 
 The Lagrangian for this utility maximization problem can be written as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
88 John Salt, “The Future of International Labor Migration,” International Migration Review, Vol 26, Issue 
4: 1104-1105, Winter 1992. 
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)      (  ),,( ,, CpxmIlrxu inin --+-= l  L , 
where l is the Lagrange multiplier and the individual’s utility, ui, depends on location, n.  
Location is designated as current (c) or destination (d), such that 
( )
( ) .  s.t.,,,max
  s.t. ,,,max
CpxmIIrxuu
pxmIlrxuu
n
ddddd
ccccc
+³+=
³+=
=  
 Using rational choice, the individual will migrate if ud > uc.  In other words, an 
individual’s migration decision, Mi, involves comparing the costs and benefits of 
migration to the costs and benefits of not migrating, as follows. 
)]()[( ,,,, icidicidi CostsCostsBenefitsBenefitsfM ---=  
While economics studies typically focus on the costs and benefits associated with 
wage, unemployment, education, economic growth, and the like, sociology studies 
typically focus on environmental and neighborhood factors.  The migration model 
presented in this research is unique by the fact that it considers the impacts of both the 
economic and sociological factors on the benefits and costs of migration, and hence, on 
the migration of an individual. 
The remainder of this chapter provides a mathematical analysis of the expected 
impact of each variable on an individual’s migration decision. 
3.3 The Benefits and Costs of Migration 
 The expected benefits and expected costs of migration are a function of both 
economic and sociological factors, as shown by the following relationship. 
),,,,()( XNTCJEfCBfM iiiiiii DDD=D-D=  
Where,  
? Bi = Expected benefitsd,i – Expected benefitsc,i 
? Ci   = Expected costsd,i – Expected costsc,i 
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and,   
Ei = individual’s expected future stream of earnings due to migration 
? Ji = individual’s job opportunity differential between the destination 
city I current city (Jd,I – Jc,i) 
TCi = the individual’s total cost of migration (monetary & non-monetary) 
? Ni = individual’s expected neighborhood satisfaction differential 
between the destination city and the current city (Nd,I – Nc,i) 
? X  = differentials for a vector of additional characteristics between the 
destination city and the current city ( dX – cX ) 
 
 However, this benefit/cost relationship fails to capture the complexity of the 
migration decision.  In reality, several other factors independently influence each of the 
direct effect variables identified above.  In addition, the vector of additional 
characteristics includes factors that both directly and indirectly influence the decision to 
migrate.  Consequently, the list of significant factors that influence the migration decision 
grows to include the following. 
 
? Wi   = individual’s expected wage differential between the destination city 
and the current city (Wd,I – Wc,i) 
Ai = individual’s age 
? U = unemployment rate differential between the destination city and the 
current city (Ud – Uc) 
? G = economic growth differential between the destination city and the 
current city (Gd – Gc) 
Expi = individual’s work experience and skills 
Ti = individual’s job tenure 
EDi = Individual’s level of educational attainment 
Ki = individual’s knowledge of job opportunities in the destination 
location 
Mi = individual’s marital status 
Fi = individual’s family size 
D  = distance of migration 
? CR = crime rate differential between the destination city and the current 
city (CRd – CRc) 
I = information access 
? L = cost of living differential between the destination city and the 
current city (Ld – Lc) 
? S = community services differential between the destination city and 
the current city (Sd – Sc) 
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 The expected first order conditions of both the direct and indirect effects on 
migration are specified and explained in the next section. 
3.4 First Order Conditions 
 If the first order condition of migration with respect to a particular variable is 
positive, then the probability that the individual will migrate is greater, because the 
benefits of migration exceed the costs of migration.  If the first order condition is 
negative, then the probability that the individual will stay is greater, because migration 
will result in a larger cost than benefit.   
 The variables defined in the previous section both directly and indirectly affect 
the migration decision, through their influences on the costs and benefits of migration.  
The direct effects are those that influence the decision to migrate because they directly 
add to a cost or benefit.  As previously stated, these direct effects are influenced by many 
other factors, referred to as indirect effects because they impact the migration decision 
through their influence on direct effect variables.  The direct and indirect effects on the 
migration decision are analyzed in separate sections below, and those of interest for this 
research are summarized in tables 3 and 4 at the end of this chapter. 
3.4.1 Direct Effects on the Decision to Migrate 
 Direct effects on the decision to migrate include the expected future stream of 
earnings, job opportunities, cost of migration, neighborhood satisfaction, and a vector of 
additional characteristics.  Each of these direct effects is influenced by a number of 
indirect effects, which will be defined in the next section.  The influence of each direct 
effect on the migration decision is specified below, based on existing research discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
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Future stream of earnings: 
i
i
E
M
¶
¶
 = + 
 The future stream of earnings is a function of the individual’s expected wage 
differential between the current and destination locations, the individual’s age, and the 
discount rate.  An increase in the expected future stream of earnings resulting from 
migration will positively influence the decision to migrate.   
Job opportunity differential: 
i
i
J
M
D¶
¶
= + 
 Job opportunity is a function of the unemployment rate differential, the economic 
growth rate differential, the individual’s experience and skills, as well as her knowledge 
of potential job opportunities in the destination location.  A positive job opportunity 
differential between will positively influence the decision to migrate.  
Total cost of migration: 
iTC
iM
¶
¶
 = – 
 The total cost of migration as includes the direct costs of the move, the indirect 
costs, and the psychic costs resulting from migration.  All of these costs depend upon 
such factors as marital status, family size, age, and the distance of migration.  As the cost 
of migration increases, individuals will be less likely to migrate. 
Neighborhood satisfaction differential: 
i
i
N
M
D¶
¶
 = + 
 The neighborhood satisfaction differential is dependent upon crime rate, 
information access, cost of living, and available community services.  A positive 
expected neighborhood satisfaction differential will positively influence the migration 
decision.   
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3.4.2 Indirect Effects on the Decision to Migrate 
 As previously explained, the indirect effects are those that influence the migration 
decision through their influence on direct effect variables.  Each of the direct effect 
variables is defined below as a function of the indirect effects that influence it, and the 
expected first order conditions are specified for each indirect effect. 
 
Future stream of earnings: )ratediscount ,,( iii AWfE D=  
Expected wage differential: 
i
i
W
E
D¶
¶
 = + 
 If the expected wage in the destination location is greater than the wage in the 
current location, then the wage differential will be positive, and the expected future 
stream of earnings increases as a result of migration. 
Age:  
i
i
A
E
¶
¶
 = – 
 Since the future stream of earnings resulting from migration depends in part on 
the remaining number of years of employment, an older individual will have a lower 
future stream of earnings than a younger individual, all else constant. 
Discount rate 
 Some theorists view the discount rate as individual, where each person has an 
internal rate dependent upon his or her degree of patience.  Others view the discount rate 
as an external, macroeconomic factor.  The supporting evidence for each perception is 
not addressed in this study, and therefore, the effect of the discount rate on earnings is 
undetermined in this analysis. 
Job Opportunity Differential: )),,(),,,(,,( DIEDKATEDExpGUfJ iiiiiii DD=D  
  64 
 
 In this equation, the unemployment differential and the economic growth 
differential are location characteristics that will influence an individual’s ability to attain 
employment.  Experience and skills are a function of education, and also depend upon 
such factors as an individual’s age, tenure on the job, and education, while knowledge of 
job opportunities in the destination location depends upon education level, information 
access, and the distance of migration.  These various impacts on the job opportunity 
differential are specified and summarized below. 
Unemployment rate differential: 
U
J i
D¶
D¶
 = – 
 When the unemployment rate differential is a positive number, the unemployment 
rate is higher in the destination location than the current location.  Higher unemployment 
has a negative impact on job opportunities in the destination location. 
Economic growth differential: 
G
J i
D¶
D¶
 = + 
 A positive economic growth differential implies greater economic growth in the 
destination location relative to the current location, and hence, greater job opportunity as 
the result of migration.  The economic growth rate of a community is a reflection of the 
number of new businesses and organizations, and therefore is a measure of the 
employment opportunities. 
Experience and skills: 
),,( iiii
i
ATEDExp
J
¶
D¶
 = + or – 
 Individuals who possess greater experience and skills generally have greater job 
opportunity.  Although it is not clear whether they will have more opportunity in the 
destination location than in the current location, the literature generally finds that highly 
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educated individuals have more knowledge of jobs in other locations.  Therefore, if 
experience and skills are positively influenced by education, it follows that more 
experienced individuals will have greater job opportunity as the result of migration.  
However, increased experience may also be the result of age or job tenure, which both 
decrease the likelihood of migration.  Therefore, the effect of experience on job 
opportunity is undetermined. 
Knowledge of job opportunities: 
),,( DIEDK
J
ii
i
¶
D¶
  = + 
 Knowledge of opportunities is influenced by one’s education level, the 
accessibility of information, and the distance of migration.  Those with higher levels of 
education are more knowledgeable of job opportunities in other locations because they 
are employed in industries with wider national and international reach.  In addition, these 
individuals are more likely to be members of professional or educational associations that 
provide job opportunity information.  Knowledge of opportunities also depends upon the 
accessibility of information, including telephone service, radio and television broadcasts, 
and transportation systems, which allow individuals to gain information from outside 
regions, states, or countries.  Lastly, knowledge of job opportunities in the destination 
location will depend on the distance of migration.  Individuals are more likely to be 
aware of opportunities in areas close to their current location than in areas farther away. 
 Regardless of the underlying reasons, increased knowledge of job opportunities 
will increase the likelihood of employment after migration. 
Total Cost of Migration: ),,,( DAFMfTC iiii =  
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 The total cost of migration includes the direct costs, the indirect costs, and the 
psychic costs.  Common factors that influence one or more of these costs are marital 
status, family size, age, and the distance of migration. 
Marital status: 
i
i
M
TC
¶
¶
 = + or – 
 The influence of marital status on the cost of migration depends upon whether or 
not one’s spouse is employed.  If the spouse is employed, then the direct costs of the 
move may be reduced, as a two-income family is more able to afford the moving costs.  
However, an employed spouse will have to give up employment in the current location, 
thus increasing the indirect costs of the move.  If one’s spouse is unemployed, then the 
direct costs may be lower because the unemployed individual is able to assume the 
burden of packing and moving the household.  Unmarried individuals are typically more 
mobile because they have fewer ties to the current location, and consequently fewer 
indirect and psychic costs of migration.  However, these individuals may also find it more 
difficult to bear the financial burden of the move.  Therefore, the effect of marital status 
on the total cost of the move cannot be determined. 
Family size: 
i
i
F
TC
¶
¶
 =  + 
 Family size will increase the cost of migration by influencing both the direct and 
psychic costs.  A larger family is more costly to move based on the number of 
possessions and the necessary accommodations during the move.  Similarly, a larger 
family has more ties to the current location (i.e. school, neighborhood, and friends), and 
consequently will experience greater psychic costs as the result of migration. 
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Age: 
i
i
A
TC
¶
¶
 =  + 
 Older individuals experience higher total costs of migration through increased 
indirect and psychic costs.  Since job tenure typically increases with age, if an older 
individual migrates, she gives up that job tenure, and possibly the retirement options and 
benefits that have accrued.  In addition, older individuals have more ties to a community 
than younger individuals, which will increase the psychic costs of the move. 
Distance of migration: 
D
TCi
¶
¶
 =  + 
 Since moving costs are generally based on miles traveled, the direct cost of the 
move will increase as distance of migration increases.  In addition, psychic costs are 
greater when individuals move farther away from their current friends, neighbors, and 
relatives.  Therefore, the total cost of migration will increase with the distance of 
migration. 
Neighborhood Satisfaction Differential: ),,( SLCRfN i DDD=D  
 As previously discussed, an individual’s neighborhood satisfaction depends upon 
factors such as crime rate, cost of living, and available community services. 
Crime rate differential: 
CR
N i
D¶
D¶
 =  – 
 A positive crime rate differential indicates a higher rate of crime in the destination 
location than in the current location.  Therefore, a positive crime rate differential will 
negatively impact the expected neighborhood satisfaction resulting from migration. 
Cost of living differential: 
L
N i
D¶
D¶
 =  – 
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 A positive cost of living differential implies a higher cost of living in the 
destination location than the current location, which is expected to decrease an 
individual’s neighborhood satisfaction.  The cost of living is determined by an index 
measure that includes such costs as medical services, housing, food, and entertainment. 
Community services differential: 
S
N i
D¶
D¶
 =  + 
 Community services include medical facilities, police protection, legal systems, 
public parks, public education, transportation, community infrastructure, and the like.  
The community services differential is positive if the services in the destination location 
are better than the services in the current location, and the expected neighborhood 
satisfaction will increase with migration. 
3.4.3 Summary of Direct and Indirect Effects 
 The previous section identified direct and indirect effects on the costs and benefits 
of migration, and specified the expected first order conditions.  Table 3 provides a 
summary of the expected first order conditions for the direct effects on the individual’s 
decision to migrate. 
Table 3: First Order Conditions for Direct Effects 
Variable Description ?Mi 
Ei individual’s expected future stream of earnings due to migration + 
? Ji individual’s job opportunity differential between the destination city 
and the current city (Jd,i – Jc,i) 
+ 
TCi individual’s total cost of migration – 
? Ni individual’s expected neighborhood satisfaction differential between 
the destination city and the current city (Nd,i – Nc,i) 
+ 
? X  
 
differentials for a vector of characteristics between the destination city 
and the current city ( dX – cX ) 
+ or – 
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 Table 4 provides the expected first order conditions for select indirect effects that 
will be of particular interest in the theoretical model presented in the following chapter. 
Table 4: First Order Conditions for Select Indirect Effects 
First 
Order 
Condition 
 
Description of Explanatory Variable 
 
Signs 
i
i
W
E
D¶
¶
 individual’s expected wage differential between the destination city 
and the current city (Wd,i – Wc,i) 
+ 
U
J i
D¶
D¶
 unemployment rate differential between the destination city and the 
current city (Ud – Uc) 
– 
G
J i
D¶
D¶
 economic growth differential between the destination city and the 
current city (Gd – Gc) 
+ 
i
i
ED
J
¶
D¶
 individual’s level of educational and experience = 
i
i
i
i
ED
Exp
Exp
J
¶
¶
*
¶
D¶
 +  
i
i
I
J
¶
D¶
 Information access and knowledge of opportunities = 
I
K
K
J i
i
i
¶
¶
*
¶
D¶
 + 
i
i
F
TC
¶
¶
 individual’s family size + 
CR
N i
D¶
D¶
 crime rate differential between the destination city and the current 
city (CRd – CRc) 
– 
S
N i
D¶
D¶
 community services differential between the destination city and the 
current city (Sd – Sc) 
+ 
 
3.5 Aggregation of Individual Decisions 
The model of individual migration presented in this chapter is the basis for the 
empirical estimates of aggregate migration, which will follow in chapter 4.  The 
differences between the individual model and the aggregate model are twofold.  First, in 
the aggregate model, it is not possible to distinguish between the current location and the 
destination location.  Rather, aggregate migration behavior is analyzed using the net 
migration into a region.  If the net migration is positive, then in-migration exceeds out-
migration, which implies that the pull factors of migration were stronger than the push 
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factors.  However, if the net migration is negative, then the push factors were stronger, 
causing more individuals to leave the region than to arrive.  Regardless, the direct and 
indirect effects on an individual’s migration decision are still reflected in the aggregate 
model presented in the following chapter.  Second, not all variables in the individual 
migration model are available in the aggregate data.  When necessary, chapter 4 provides 
explanations of variables that are proxied by other characteristics, based on available 
aggregate data. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
 
 This chapter developed a theoretical model of individual migration behavior.  In 
this model, the probability of migration is a function of the expected benefits and costs of 
migration, as compared to the expected benefits and costs of staying in the current 
location.  This same model is used in the following chapter to derive and test hypotheses 
of aggregate migration behavior, using Russian regional data. 
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Chapter 4 
Migration in the Russian Federation: Analysis of 33 Regions 
 
4.1 Russian Federation Migration 
 As seen below, Russian net migration from 1979 to 1999 is nearly always 
positive, but varies significantly from one year to the next.89 
 Figure 2: Russian Net Migration, 1979 - 1999 
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 Created by the author, with information obtained from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” 
Washington D.C., 2001.90 
 
 Although figure 2 depicts net migration from 1979 through 1999, this research is 
most concerned with the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1991 through the 
present.  Considering this time period, the inflow of migrants appears to have reached its 
maximum in 1994 and, although still positive, has declined in each year since.   It is 
important to recognize that a positive net migration value does not imply that individuals 
                                                          
89 Positive net migration (immigration) implies more people entering the country than leaving the country, 
while negative net migration (emigration) implies more people leaving the country than entering the 
country. 
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are not leaving the country.  Large numbers of individuals emigrated from Russia in this 
time period as well.  A 1992 article in the International Migration Review predicted that 
emigration from Russia would reach its maximum in 1993 due to the exodus of 
approximately 1.5 million people between the years 1993 and 1994.91  Regardless of 
whether one is looking at immigration, emigration, or net migration, this macroeconomic 
approach does little to explain the migration behavior of individuals and the push or pull 
factors responsible for their decisions.  The remainder of this chapter is devoted to 
analyzing the migration flow and influencing factors in 33 regions of the Russia 
Federation. 
4.2 Russian Regions 
The Russian Federation is comprised of 89 different regions, referred to as 
autonomous republics, krais, oblasts, or autonomous okrugs, depending on the structure 
and governing body in each.  This empirical analysis is devoted to 33 of the 89 regions, 
chosen either because they contain a closed nuclear weapons complex city, or because 
they border a region that contains a closed nuclear city.  The logic for choosing these 
particular regions is two-fold.  First, due to the historic secret nature of the closed nuclear 
cities, and the still present restrictions for access, there is little or no data available 
regarding the populations of the nuclear cities themselves.  In the absence of this 
information, data will be scrutinized for the region in which the city exists.  Second, the 
surrounding regions are chosen in order to determine if the presence of a closed nuclear 
city in one region results in different migration behavior than in the other regions without 
                                                                                                                                                                             
90 Migration has been calculated for each year using the following equation: migrationy = populationy – 
(populationy-1 + birthsy – deathsy), where y is the year of observation and the population is reported at year-
end. 
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Figure 3:  Russian Regional Map 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
91 Lilia Shevtsova, “Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow,” International Migration Review, Vol 
26, Issue2: 244, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration, Summer 1992. 
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closed cities.  If all 89 Russian regions are used in the analysis, the diversity across 
Russia’s vast landscape may lead to incorrect conclusions.  By only choosing regions that 
border the closed nuclear city regions, and therefore are less environmentally and 
economically diverse, this impact will be minimized.   
The map shown as figure 3 on the previous page depicts the geographic relation 
between the regions containing the closed nuclear weapons complex cities and their 
surrounding regions.  The map shows only six regions containing closed nuclear cities, 
while ten such cities exist.  This is due to the fact that three of the regions contain more 
than one closed nuclear city; Lesnoy and Novouralsk are both located in the Sverdlovsk 
region, while Ozersk, Snezhinsk, and Trekhgornyy are all located in Chelyabinsk, and 
Zelenogorsk and Zheleznogorsk are both in Krasnoyarsk. 
Rather than provide a detailed analysis of the economic activity in each of the 33 
regions separately, table 5 on the following page briefly overviews the main economic 
activity or industry of each region.  The table also provides information about whether or 
not a closed nuclear city exists in the region, and if so, which city or cities.   Information 
for the regions containing closed nuclear cities is presented in bold text. 
The remainder of this chapter provides a description of the data, methodology, 
and results of modeling and empirically testing migration in these 33 regions of the 
Russian Federation. 
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Table 5: Industry Information for 33 Regions of the Russian Federation 
Region Name 
(alphabetical) 
Closed 
Nuclear City? Information on Primary Industry(ies) 
Bashkortostan 
Autonomous Region No 
one of Russia's key petroleum producing areas and the center of 
Russia's petroleum refining industry 
Chelyabinsk Oblast 
Yes; Ozersk, 
Snezhinsk, & 
Trekhgornyy 
one of most industrialized territories of Russia; high levels of 
pollution, radioactivity in land and water supplies, and high 
rate of disease 
Chuvash Autonomous 
Republic No strong agriculture and industry presence 
Evenk Autonomous 
Okrug No 
large hydro electrical potential; currently undeveloped and 
economically insignificant with mainly agricultural production 
Irkutsk Oblast No significant fuel, energy and water resources; timber and minerals; one of most economically developed regions 
Ivanov Oblast No historic center of Russia's cotton-milling industry; mainly textile industry, including flax 
Kemerova Oblast No economy is based on industry, but includes rich mineral resources; one of the major coal reserves in the world 
Khakassiya 
Autonomous Republic No 
strong industrial sector, including forestry and ore mining; 
extensive mineral deposits  
Khanti-Mansi 
Autonomous Okrug No 
economy based primarily on industry; mainly petroleum and 
natural gas extraction and refining 
Kirov Oblast No agriculture and industrial based industries; also renowned for manufacturing of toys and wood products (especially skis) 
Komi Autonomous 
Republic No 
2nd largest fuel and energy base in Russia; Europe's largest area 
of virgin forest 
Kostroma Oblast No industrial production is mostly energy; only region with energy surplus in 1998, able to export electrical energy 
Krasnoyarsk Krais 
(includes Evenk & 
Taimyr AOs) 
Yes; 
Zelenogorsk & 
Zheleznogorsk 
potentially one of Russia's richest regions with vast deposits 
of minerals, gold, and petroleum; also agriculture and other 
industrial production 
Kurgan Oblast No 
industrial production is the basis of the economy, including fuel 
and energy, food processing, and medical; agriculture is also 
substantial, including grains, meat, and milk 
Mari El Autonomous 
Republic No 
agriculture and industrial production; including animal husbandry 
and processing of forestry products 
Mordova Autonomous 
Republic No 
agriculture and industrial production; including animal husbandry 
and mechanical engineering 
Nizhegorod Oblast 
(Nizhnii-Novgorod) Yes; Sarov 
one of three most industrially devloped regions in Russia; 
manufacture autos, metallurgy, chemicals, petrochemicals; 
also agriculture and forestry 
Novosibirsk Oblast No agricultural production, including fur-breeding animals and flax; extraction industries, including coal, petroleum, natural gas 
Omsk Oblast No one of highest ranking in Russia for industrial output; Omsk Petroleum Refinery is one of Russia's largest and most modern 
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Table 5 continued: Industry Information for 33 Regions of the Russian Federation 
Region Name 
(alphabetical) 
Closed 
Nuclear City? Information on Primary Industry(ies) 
Orenburg Oblast No 
high level of industrialization with intensive exploitation of 
petroleum and natural gas; high level of pollution and serious 
damage to land; produces about 2/5 of asbestos in Russia 
Penza Oblast Yes; Zarechnyy large agricultural industry; nearly 3/4 of agricultural land is fertile black earth; also large industrial production 
Perm Oblast No main industries are coal, petroleum and natural gas; also petroleum refining and processing of forestry products 
Ryazan Oblast No 
mainly agriculture and horticulture, due to warm and moist climate; 
also industrial production, including petroleum processing, 
chemicals, and food processing 
Saratov Oblast No 
strong agricultural industry and one of Russia's major producers of 
wheat; also petroleum refining, chemicals, and production of 
petroleum and natural gas 
Sverdlovsk Oblast Yes; Lesnoy & Novouralsk 
one of leading industrial producers in Russia, including 
metallurgy, chemicals, processing forestry and agricultural 
products; produces copper and other ores 
Taimyr Aautonomous 
Okrug No 
main industries are ore mining (coal, copper, nickel) and food 
processing; also has reserves of cobalt and platinum 
Tambov Oblast No mostly agricultural and industrial production, including animal husbandry, horticulture, electrical energy, and food processing 
Tomsk Oblast Yes; Seversk industrial sector plays dominant role; sustainable reserves of coal, petroleum, and natural gas 
Tuva Autonomous 
Republic No 
largely agricultural based, including animal husbandry, forestry, 
and hunting; also industrial production, including ore mining, 
electricity, and light manufacturing 
Tyumen Oblast No vast hydrocarbons and timber reserves; huge portion of Russia's total reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and peat 
Ul'Yanovsk Oblast No large agricultural industry; over 4/5 of ag land is arable; some industries, including automobile and airplane manufacturing 
Vladimir Oblast No rich in peat and timber reserves; industries include mechanical engineering, wood working, chemicals, and glass-making 
Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug No 
main industries are natural gas and petroleum production; also 
processing of agricultural and forestry products 
Created by the author with information obtained from Territories of the Russian Federation, 2nd edition,  
 London England: Europa Publications, 2001. 
 
4.3 Data 
Throughout this research process, a lack of available Russian data has been 
problematic.  The Russian Federation is currently undertaking steps to conduct a national 
census, which will be the first of its kind since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  In the 
meantime, Russian Federation data is not readily available.  Information pertaining to the 
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Soviet Union as a whole, prior to 1991 is fairly plentiful, but it is impossible to 
disentangle the Russian Federation data from that of the other 14 newly independent 
states (NISs) of the Former Soviet Union.   The Russian Statistical Agency, Goskomstat, 
provides access to a number of publications with specifically Russian information, 
however, the compilation of such information is relatively new and generally only 
available for the past two or three years.  In addition, regional data is extremely scarce in 
all time periods.  
 Two publications have been used to create a pooled data set for this empirical 
research.  The first, Russia and Eurasia Facts and Figures Annual, formerly USSR Facts 
and Figures Annual, compiles data from the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. 
Congress, several departments of the U.S. government, Soviet handbooks, United 
Nations Yearbooks, the World and Soviet Press, as well as encyclopedias, monographs, 
and histories of Russia and the Soviet Union.92  The second, The Territories of the 
Russian Federation 2001, provides a summary of economic, social, and environmental 
issues and activities for all 89 regions of the Russian Federation, as well as summary 
statistics for the year 1998.93  A data appendix is provided with the descriptive statistics 
in appendix B of this document. 
This panel data set includes 13 independent variables for 33 regions of the 
Russian Federation, covering the years 1991 through 1998.  However, three regions 
contain incomplete data sets, which reduces the cross section to 30 regions for all linear 
                                                          
92 Russia and Eurasia Fact and Figures Annual, editor Lawrence R. Robertson, Gulf Breeze, Florida: 
Academic International Press, volumes 1-25, 1977-1999.  Formerly named USSR Facts and Figures 
Annual. 
93 The Territories of the Russian Federation, London, England: Europa Publications, 2001. 
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regression analysis.  A complete list of variable identifications and descriptions is 
provided in the next section. 
4.4 Variable Identification and Methodology 
Table 6 on the next page provides a description of each of the variables used in 
this empirical research.  The dependent variable, net migration rate (MIG_RATE), is 
calculated by dividing net migration by population for each region, in each year.  The 
migration rate is a positive value if in-migration to the region exceeds out-migration from 
the region, and is negative if out-migration exceeds in-migration.  The thirteen 
independent variables used in this empirical model are chosen based on the theoretical 
model presented in chapter 3.  These variables influence the migration decision both 
directly and indirectly, and may positively or negatively impact that decision.   
Closed city (CLOSED_CITY) is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 
when a closed nuclear city exists in the region of observation, and assumes the value of 0 
when a closed nuclear city does not exist in that particular region.  In addition to the 13 
independent variables, 12 interaction terms have been created in order to determine 
whether or not push and pull factors for migration are different in regions containing 
closed nuclear cities than in regions without closed nuclear cities.  As an example, 
CLOSED_CITY interacted with DOCS_PER_1000 creates the variable 
CLOSED_CITYxDOCS_PER_1000.  Finally, seven dummy variables are used to 
distinguish the years of observation from 1992 through 1998.  The year 1992 is the 
benchmark year and therefore is not included in any of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression models.  A yearly trend variable (TIME_TREND) is also created for use in 
panel data estimation.  Although migration behavior is observed in the year 1991, there is 
no data available for 1990, which is necessary for the one-year time lag models that will 
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be used in this analysis.  Therefore, net migration rate in 1991 is not considered in any of 
the remaining analysis.  
Table 6: Variable Identification and Description for Russian Regions Data 
VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION DESCRIPTION
MIG_RATE migration rate= net migration/population
1992 year of migration (1=yes, 0=no)
1993 year of migration (1=yes, 0=no)
1994 year of migration (1=yes, 0=no)
1995 year of migration (1=yes, 0=no)
1996 year of migration (1=yes, 0=no)
1997 year of migration (1=yes, 0=no)
1998 year of migration (1=yes, 0=no)
CONS_ constant
TIME_TREND time trend
CLOSED_CITY region contains a closed nuclear city (1=yes, 0=no)
PRCNT_UNEMP percent unemployed of working age population
LOG_AVG_MO_INC log of average monthly income
PRCNT_CHILD
percent of children in population (proxied by number 
of children in general schools)
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED percent of population enrolled in higher education
DOCS_PER_1000 doctors per 1000 people
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP housing space per capita in square meters
CRIME_PER_100K number of crimes per 100,000 people
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM
housing construction completed in thousands of 
square meters
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM bus passengers in millions per kilometer
PHONES_PER_1000 telephones per 1000 people
LOG_CAP_INVEST log of general capital investment
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP number of organizations and enterprises per capita
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_UNEMP
closed city X percent unemployed of working age 
population
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_AVG_MO_INC closed city X log of average monthly income
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD closed city X percent of children in population
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_HIGH_ED
closed city X percent of population enrolled in higher 
education
CLOSED_CITYxDOCS_PER_1000 closed city X number of doctors per 1000 people
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSESPACE_PER_CAP
closed city X housing space per capita in square 
meters
CLOSED_CITYxCRIME_PER_100K closed city X number of crimes per 100,000 people
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSE_COMP_THSQM
closed city X housing construction completed in 
thousands of square meters
CLOSED_CITYxBUS_PASS_MIL/KM closed city X bus passengers in millions per kilometer
CLOSED_CITYxPHONES_PER_1000 closed city X telephones per 1000 people
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_CAP_INVEST closed city X log of general capital investment
CLOSED_CITYxORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP
closed city X number of organizations and 
enterprises per capita  
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 Chapter 2 provided a detailed description of the four dominant models of labor 
mobility and identified a number of variables commonly used in migration analysis.  
Chapter 3 laid out the theoretical model, distinguishing between direct and indirect 
effects, and determining the expected influence of each on the migration decision.  Now, 
an empirical model is created and tested, based on the available data and the time frame 
of interest.  The analysis in this chapter is based on the methodology developed in the 
previous chapter, which incorporates ideology from all four mobility models.  It utilizes 
variables from each model, as well as additional interaction terms and time variables.  
The approach is similar to that used by Landale and Guest (1985), which incorporates 
traditional individual and household characteristics with community attachment and 
satisfaction variables in OLS models to determine the contributing factors to migration 
behavior.94  In the current model, the dependent variable is net migration rate 
(MIG_RATE) in each of 30 Russian regions for the years 1992 through 1998, and the 
purpose is to determine contributing factors and directions of influence in the migration 
decision, while considering individual, household, community satisfaction, and capital 
investment and infrastructure variables. 
 In this endeavor, explanatory variables include an income measurement, as in the 
classical competitive model of labor mobility.  Two income variables were compiled for 
this analysis.  The average monthly income (LOG_AVG_MO_INC) is a measure of 
income per capita, and is generally assumed to reflect the economic well being of 
individuals in society.  The average monthly salary variable is also available in this data.  
This is a measure of income per worker, and is generally assumed to reflect the economic 
                                                          
94 Landale and Guest, 199. 
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well being of employees in society.  Nominal income and salary values have been 
transformed to real values based on the 1995 Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the Russian 
Ruble, and all values are logged in order to provide for better comparison across regions 
with differing economic growth.  However, as will be discussed later in this paper, results 
are only presented for the LOG_AVG_MO_INC variable. 
 Several independent variables used in this analysis are derived from the 
investment in human capital model of labor mobility.  Percentage of children in the 
population (PRCNT_CHILD) is included as a proxy for family size and the presence of 
children in families.  The percentage of the population enrolled in higher education 
(PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED) is included as a proxy for educational attainment in the society.  
The percentage of the working age population unemployed (PRCNT_UNEMP) measures 
the tightness of the labor market in each region. 
 Measures of community and residential satisfaction include housing space per 
capita (HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP), which is a measure of crowding, incidence of crime 
per 100,000 people (CRIME_PER_100K), and the availability of doctors per 1000 people 
in the region (DOCS_PER_1000).   
The remaining variables of consideration are measures of economic growth and 
changing infrastructure.  These measures include housing completion in thousands of 
square meters (HOUSE_COMP_THSQM), general capital investment in the economy 
(LOG_CAP_INVEST), and the number of organizations and enterprises 
(ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP) in the regions.  As with the income and salary variables, the 
capital investment figures have been adjusted for inflation using the 1995 CPI for the 
Russian Ruble, and have been logged to allow for comparison across regions.  The total 
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number of organizations and enterprises in each region is divided by the population of the 
region, creating a per capita measure, in order to provide a better comparison of 
infrastructure across regions of different population size.  In addition, the number of bus 
passengers in millions per kilometer (BUS_PASS_MIL/KM) and the number of 
telephones per 1000 people (PHONES_PER_1000) are measures of infrastructure 
availability as well as communication in the economy. 
4.5 Hypotheses 
The push and pull factors mentioned thus far, plus several interaction terms and 
time designation variables are used to test the following four hypotheses about migration 
behavior in 33 regions of the Russian Federation. 
HO1: Net migration rate is statistically the same in regions that contain closed 
nuclear cities as in regions that do not contain closed nuclear cities. 
 
A rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that the presence of a closed 
nuclear city does in fact affect the migration behavior in that region, as compared to 
regions that do not contain closed nuclear cities.  A failure to reject the null hypothesis 
would mean that closed nuclear cities do not impact migration behavior in the region to 
which they belong. 
HO2: Net migration rate is statistically the same across all years of observation. 
 
Rejecting the second null hypothesis would indicate that migration behavior in 
these 33 regions of the Russian Federation has not changed in the years since the break-
up of the Soviet Union.  If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it will mean that the 
migration rate has been constant. 
HO3: The factors that influence migration are statistically the same in regions that 
contain closed nuclear cities as in regions that do not contain closed nuclear 
cities. 
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A rejection of the null hypothesis will imply a difference in the push and pull 
factors for migration between regions that contain closed nuclear cities and those that do 
not contain closed nuclear cities.  Failure to reject the null will imply that the presence of 
a closed nuclear city does not affect the factors that influence migration. 
HO4: The factors that influence migration are statistically the same across all 
years of observation. 
 
Rejecting this null hypothesis will mean that the factors that influence migration 
have changed in the time period since the break-up of the Soviet Union.  This could be 
attributed to individuals in the economy adjusting their behavior during and after the 
transition from a socialist economy to a capitalist economy, or to the programs 
established to aid the Russian economy and prevent emigration.  A failure to reject the 
null hypothesis would imply that the factors that influence migration have remained 
constant over time. 
The results of this series of hypothesis tests will shed light on the success of U.S. 
funding efforts to reduce emigration from the closed cities of the Russian Federation’s 
nuclear weapons complex and will aid in formulating future policy recommendations. 
4.6 The Models 
 The four hypotheses established in the previous section are tested using both non-
parametric analysis and regression analysis.  Proportions tests are conducted for the 
dependent variable, net migration rate, comparing between regions containing closed 
nuclear cities and those without closed nuclear cities, as well as comparing within each 
over time.  Figure 4 on the next page shows the net migration rates for regions containing 
closed nuclear cities and those without closed nuclear cities for the year 1992 through the 
year 1998. 
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These results seem to indicate a consistent difference in the net migration rates for 
regions with closed nuclear cities compared to those without.  Although, the net 
migration rate in each instance is a very small percentage of the population, it is 
interesting to note that through 1994, the regions with closed cities had lower net 
migration rates than those without closed cities, while after 1994 the results are opposite.  
The question is whether or not there exists a statistical difference between such small 
values.  A Z test statistic is used to compare proportions from two populations and test 
the difference in net migration rates between and within the two types of regions. 
Figure 4: Net Migration Rates in Regions with and without Closed Nuclear Cities 
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The calculated Z test statistic value is compared to the critical Z value using a 
two-sided test and a 95% confidence interval (critical Z = +/- 1.96)95.  Table 7 below 
reveals that there is no statistical difference in the net migration rate between regions 
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containing closed nuclear cities and those without closed nuclear cities in any of the years 
from 1992 through 1998. 
Table 7: Comparison of Net Migration Rates Using Z Test Statistics 
 Regions with Closed  
Nuclear Cities 
Regions without Closed  
Nuclear Cities 
Comparison 
Year Population Net Migration 
Migration 
Rate Population 
Net 
Migration 
Migration 
Rate Z-Value 
1992 18026600 9631.05 .0005343 43673800 46695.04 .0010692 -.0471777 
1993 17937700 15153.32 .0008448 43636100 117213.35 .0026862 -.1188861 
1994 17898900 86603.1 .0048385 43713200 285272.2 .0065260 -.0522622 
1995 17850600 69647.12 .0039017 43659900 141478.59 .0032405 .238688 
1996 17787500 43304.97 .0024346 43524700 74210.39 .0017050 .0337304 
1997 17739500 53083 .0029924 43490000 113414.42 .0026078 .0157834 
1998 17687000 42312 .0023923 43410000 74766 .0017223 .0311876 
 
 Similarly, table 8 provides the Z values, computed using the same methodology, 
to compare migration rates between years.  Again, this approach reveals no statistical 
difference in migration rates from one year to another both for regions with, and for 
regions without, closed nuclear cities.  
Table 8: Z-Values for Yearly Comparisons 
   
Years of 
Comparison
Z-Values for 
Regions with 
Closed Nuclear 
Cities
Z-Values for 
Regions 
without Closed 
Nuclear Cities
1992 to 1993 -0.020488691 -0.137260527
1993 to 1994 -0.130039502 -0.20844513
1994 to 1995 0.024599226 0.173221492
1995 to 1996 0.045221409 0.113606473
1996 to 1997 -0.018572235 -0.071513081
1997 to 1998 0.020059096 0.070002258   
Therefore, on the surface, we can fail to reject null hypotheses one and two.  In 
other words, these proportion comparisons indicate that the net migration rate is 
statistically the same in regions that contain closed nuclear cities as in regions without 
closed nuclear cities, and that there is no difference in the rate of migration across time.   
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However, this non-parametric approach to hypothesis testing only begins to 
scratch the surface of revealing migration behavior.  Therefore, all four hypotheses are 
further tested and scrutinized through a number of regression analyses using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression modeling. 
All OLS models tested in this regression analysis are lin-log models, meaning the 
dependent variable is linear, and one or more of the explanatory variables is logarithmic.  
The dependent variable in all four models is the net migration rate (MIG_RATE) and a 
one-year time lag is applied to the explanatory variables in each model.  The use of a one-
year time lag is consistent with the migration research presented in chapter 2, which finds 
that migration in one time period is dependent upon factors experienced in one or more 
previous time periods.  The small number of years of observation in this study prevents a 
multiple-year time lag analysis. 
The basic OLS regression model is as follows. 
tykyy uXXM ++++= -- 1121 ... bbb  
 Where M is the net migration rate in the year of observation and the Xs are the 
independent or explanatory variables observed in the previous year (y-1).  As previously 
stated, a one-year time lag is used in all models, based on the assumption that social, 
economic, and environmental factors in one time period will influence the decision to 
migrate in the next time period.  Although both monthly income and monthly salary 
variables are available, the results presented include only the income variable, as several 
different estimations of the models prove that monthly income is a better predictor of 
migration behavior and a better fit in each regression model than is monthly salary.  
Generally, salary is a measure of well being for employees, while income includes money 
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obtained from sources outside of work.  Therefore, income is a measure of well being for 
a broader category of individuals, and is a better predictor of migration behavior 
throughout the economy. 
4.7 The Regression Results 
 Table 9 presents the results of each of the linear regression models used to test the 
hypotheses presented at the beginning of this chapter.  The first model includes only the 
12 observed independent variables discussed in the methodology section of this chapter, 
plus a dummy variable coded 1 if the region contains a closed nuclear city and 0 if the 
region does not contain a closed nuclear city.  Analyses of the regression from this model 
reveal noteworthy results.  Several of the independent variables are significant at the five-
percent level, while two additional variables are significant at the ten and fifteen percent 
levels.  A summary of the results from the first regression model is as follows. 
First, an increase in the unemployment rate (RATE_UNEMP) in a region is found 
to have a negative impact on MIG_RATE, at the five percent level of significance.  In 
other words, an increase in unemployment results in an increase in out-migration.  
Similarly, an increase in the occurrence of crime (CRIMES_PER_1000) significantly 
increases the net out-flow of migrants from a region.  This model also shows that 
increases in capital investment (LOG_CAP_INVEST) and the number of organizations 
and enterprises per capita (ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP), result in statistically significant 
increases in immigration in the next time period.  All three of these results are supported 
by the labor mobility theories discussed in the previous chapter. 
More notable are the results for the monthly income (LOG_AVG_MO_INC) and number 
of phones (PHONES_PER_1000) variables regressed in model one.  As discussed in 
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chapter three, some studies find that regions with higher incomes attract labor, while 
other studies find that higher incomes provide individuals with the resources  
Table 9: Regression Results (y = net migration rate) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1993 -.0016364 -.0009505
1994  .0032918***  .0038224***
1995  .0005543  .0015376
1996 -.0000067  .0009429
1997  .0013499  .0022881
1998  .0012906  .0024247
CONS_  .0092665  .0076926  .0108442  .0092927
CLOSED_CITY -.0007714 -.0008730 -.0479734  .0066881
PRCNT_UNEMP -.0155222*** -.0150299*** -.0191394*** -.0197761***
LOG_AVG_MO_INC -.0076409*** -.0091007*** -.0070948*** -.0078276***
PRCNT_CHILD -.0615333*** -.0608283*** -.0500186** -.0473414**
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED  .0665753**  .0773355***  .0634159*  .0695906**
DOCS_PER_1000 -.0000789* -.0000867** -.0000962** -.0000993***
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP -.0000490 -.0001462 -.0000057 -.0000665
CRIME_PER_100K -.0000017*** -.0000016*** -.0000018*** -.0000017***
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM -.0000007 -.0000011 -.0000008 -.0000011
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM -.0000002 -.0000002 -.0000001 -.0000001
PHONES_PER_1000 -.0001571*** -.0001560*** -.0001857*** -.0001894***
LOG_CAP_INVEST  .0035537***  .0042708***  .0032904***  .0037120***
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP  .4782244***  .3939621***  .4932039***  .3573692***
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_UNEMP  .0091159  .0127901
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_AVG_MO_INC  .0047556  .0046046
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD -.2370447** -.2209411**
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_HIGH_ED -.5158008 -.3091927
CLOSED_CITYxDOCS_PER_1000  .0007613**  .0001896
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSESPACE_PER_CAP  .0015480  .0000294
CLOSED_CITYxCRIME_PER_100K -.0000009  .0000017
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSE_COMP_THSQM  .0000063  .0000006
CLOSED_CITYxBUS_PASS_MIL/KM -.0000017** -.0000008
CLOSED_CITYxPHONES_PER_1000  .0002124  .0002318*
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_CAP_INVEST  .0018852 -.0001505
CLOSED_CITYxORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP -.3306945 -.1852672
Number of Observations 202 202 202 202
R-Squared .3763 .4618 .4369 .5070
Adusted R-Squared .3332 .4056 .3570 .4171
***5% level of significance, **10% level of significance, *15% level of significance  
 
to engage in migration, and therefore will increase the out-flow of migrants from a 
region.  The results from model one of this study reveal that higher incomes in a region 
  89 
 
result in a statistically significant increase in out-migration.  The logical conclusion is 
that higher incomes in one time period have provided individuals with the means to 
emigrate in the subsequent time period.  A similar conclusion can be drawn from the 
results of the PHONES_PER_1000 variable.  Results indicate a statistically significant, 
but very small, negative impact on the net migration rate as the number of phones 
increases.  This variable is included in these migration models as a proxy for 
infrastructure and communication ability.   While some studies find that an increase in 
infrastructure invites immigration, there is also evidence of an increase in knowledge of 
outside opportunities as the result of growing communication infrastructure.  The 
regression results from model one indicate that an increase in the number of phones in 
one time period will result in an increase in out-migration in the next time period, 
possibly due to the increase in contact with regions outside of the present residence and 
greater awareness of economic opportunities in other regions or countries.   
Less easily explained are the directions of influence for the percent of children in 
the population (PRCNT_CHILD), the percent of the population in higher education 
(PRCNT_HIGH_ED), and the number of doctors per 100,000 people 
(DOCS_PER_1000).  Theory predicts that migration rates are lower when children are 
present in families.  This regression model reveals that an increase in PRCNT_CHILD in 
the previous time period results in an increase in emigration.  One possible explanation 
for this result is that this variable is not a correct proxy for the presence of children in 
families.  Another possibility is that this variable is revealing that families with children 
are leaving a region in an attempt to find better economic and social conditions in which 
to raise a family.   Similarly, an increase in PRCNT_HIGH_ED results in a statistically 
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significant increase in the in-flow of migrants, at the ten percent level.  As explained in 
chapter 2, other studies have found that individuals with higher levels of education 
typically have greater rates of emigration, as education provides them with skills that are 
often nationally or internationally demanded.  The positive and significant coefficient on 
the education variable in model one may indicate that individuals move into regions 
where opportunities for higher education are greater.  Or, as with the previously 
discussed variable, it is possible that PRCNT_HIGH_ED is not a correct proxy for the 
level of educational attainment in the community.  Lastly, this model reveals that as 
DOCS_PER_1000 increases, the rate of out-migration in the next time period is 
increasing at a fifteen percent level of significance.  Theory would anticipate that the 
availability of medical services in a region should increase the in-migration.  Therefore, 
this result cannot be fully explained. 
The second model is similar to the first, including the same 13 explanatory 
variables, but also including dummy variables for the years 1993 to 1998.  The 
benchmark year is 1992; all regression coefficients for the years 1993 through 1998 are 
relative to 1992.  These results reveal that the rate of in-migration in 1994 was greater 
than the 1992 rate, at a five percent level of significance.  Other regression results are 
nearly identical to those from model one, with only slight changes in the level of 
significance on the education and number of doctors variables.  A comparison of the 
adjusted R-squared values between the first two models reveals the second to be a better 
predictor of net migration rate push and pull factors.  In other words, the inclusion of the 
year variables results in a better model. 
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These first two models can be used to test the first two hypotheses established 
previously in this chapter.  Null hypothesis number one states that the migration rate is 
statistically the same in regions that contain closed nuclear cities as in regions that do not 
contain closed nuclear cities.  The closed city dummy variable is not significant in either 
of the first two models.  Consequently, we can fail to reject null hypothesis number one 
and find that the presence of a closed nuclear city in a region does not impact migration 
behavior. 
The second null hypothesis states that the migration rate is statistically the same 
across all years of observation.  This hypothesis is rejected based on the statistically 
significant coefficient on the 1994 dummy variable at the five percent level, as compared 
to the 1992 benchmark year.  This analysis finds that the net rate of migration in these 30 
regions of the Russian Federation has changed in the years since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. 
Models three and four include the same 13 explanatory variables as the previous 
two models, but also include twelve interaction terms formulated by multiplying the 
closed city (CLOSED_CITY) dummy variable with each of the remaining independent 
variables.  In the first two models, CLOSED_CITY was used to determine if the net 
migration rate is statistically different in regions that contain closed nuclear cities as in 
regions without closed nuclear cities.  In models three and four, the interaction terms are 
used to determine if the other twelve independent variables influencing the net migration 
rate differ in regions that contain closed nuclear cities relative to regions without closed 
nuclear cities.  The interaction terms provide a means of testing the third hypothesis 
established previously in the chapter, regarding whether or not the factors that influence 
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migration are the same in regions with closed nuclear cities as in regions without closed 
nuclear cities.  Models three and four differ from one another based on the inclusion of 
the year variables in the latter model. 
Model three reveals similar results to models one and two in regard to the original 
13 independent variables.  However, model three generates smaller significance levels for 
two of the explanatory variables (PRCNT_CHILD and PRCNT_HIGH_ED) and a greater 
level of significance on DOCS_PER_1000.  The more notable results from this model are 
discovered in examining the coefficients associated with the twelve interaction terms.  
The interaction terms CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD, 
CLOSED_CITYxDOCS_PER_1000, and CLOSED_CITYxBUS_PASS_MIL/KM are all 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.  The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD implies that the rate of out-migration 
increases as the number of children increases in the regions that contain closed nuclear 
cities relative to those without closed nuclear cities.  Similarly, the number of doctors in 
the population has a statistically significant influence on in-migration in the regions that 
contain closed nuclear cities.  This result is particularly noteworthy, as the sign on the 
coefficient is positive whereas the sign on the number of doctors per 1000 people without 
the interaction is negative.  This directional change indicates that individuals in regions 
with closed nuclear cities respond differently to migration factors, than do individuals in 
regions without closed nuclear cities.  Lastly, this model indicates that an increase in the 
number of bus passengers in regions with closed nuclear cities has a statistically 
significant influence on the out-migration rate. 
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All of these results imply that the push and pull factors that influence the net 
migration rate are have different effects in regions that contain closed nuclear cities than 
in regions without closed nuclear cities.  Hence, null hypothesis three is rejected, which 
stated that the factors influencing migration are statistically the same in regions that 
contain closed nuclear cities as in regions that do not contain closed nuclear cities. 
Model number four expands on model three by including the dummy variables for 
the years of observation, from 1993 to 1998, where the benchmark year is 1992.  The 
model reveals slightly different significance levels on several of the original 13 variables, 
as well as the additional 12 interaction terms.  However, most important is the 
recognition that the 1994 variable is statistically significant at the five percent level, as in 
model number two.  This result reinforces the previous conclusion that the rate of 
migration has changed across the years since the break-up of the Soviet Union.  Further, 
this model reinforces the previous conclusion that the push and pull factors that influence 
migration are different in regions that contain closed nuclear cities than in regions 
without closed nuclear cities.  This is supported by the ten and five percent levels of 
significance on CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD and 
CLOSED_CITYxPHONES_PER_1000, respectively.  Finally, a comparison of the 
adjusted R-squared values between models three and four reveals the fourth model to be a 
better predictor of migration behavior.  This result implies that the inclusion of the year 
variables is important, as was the case in comparing the adjusted R-squared values 
between the first two models.  Also noteworthy is the fact that model two is a better 
predictor of migration behavior than model three, which indicates that inclusion of the 
year variables is more important than inclusion of the interaction terms. 
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 The four regression models discussed to this point were used in three of the four 
hypothesis tests.  The fourth null hypothesis states that the factors influencing migration 
are statistically the same across all years of observation.  One method of testing this 
hypothesis would be to run a regression model containing all of the variables in model 
three, plus interaction terms for every variable with every year.  This would be a 
cumbersome model, requiring a much larger data set in order to accommodate the 
enormous number of explanatory variables.  The more manageable approach is to regress 
the original 13 independent variables on the net migration rate in each year of 
observation.  The results can then be compared using a structural break test to determine 
if any one of the time periods is statistically different from the pooled data set including 
all years of observation.  In addition, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients 
on the explanatory variables can be compared across time.  Ideally, one would wish to 
include the 12 closed city interaction terms in this regression model.   However, each 
year of data contains only 28 to 30 observations, which does not allow for regressing 
such a large number of independent variables and generating salient results.  Therefore, 
table 10 provides the regression model results for the seven years of observation, 
including only the original 13 independent variables. 
Since pooled time series data were used in previously discussed regression 
models, it is possible that there is a structural change in the relationship between the 
dependent and explanatory variables across the years of observation.  In other words, if 
external forces, policy changes, or other factors influenced migration differently in each 
year of observation, then the results from the pooled data series analysis are questionable.   
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Table 10: Regression Results by Year of Observation (y = net migration rate) 
Independent Variables Divisor 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
CONS_ 10^3   88.4** -40.6 -90.3 33.3     .5 22.9   3.8
CLOSED_CITY 10^3  -3.9***   -1.4   -4.7  -2.0    -.4    -.5  -1.3
PRCNT_UNEMP 10^3 -18.6   -5.7  60.9  -4.7 -24.3*** -40.4***  -1.5
LOG_AVG_MO_INC 10^2  -1.8   -2.3   -4.4  -1.1*  -1.2***  -1.5**  -1.5**
PRCNT_CHILD 10^2  -5.0**   -5.4 -12.0  -7.3  -3.0  -6.5  -6.0
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED 10^2  47.8***      .9  44.7   1.6 15.7   3.1   7.6
DOCS_PER_1000 10^5 -41.0***   -9.5 -56.3**  -6.4  -2.6  -3.7 -11.6
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP 10^4  -5.4    2.1  -3.8    .5   4.0  -7.0  -8.8
CRIME_PER_100K 10^6  -6.8***   -1.5    -.7   -.7     .1   -.5  -1.6
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM 10^6  -8.0***   -5.3 -12.5    .9   1.0   -.3  -3.3
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM 10^6   1.5**     -.5   -1.5    .5    -.2   -.5     .1
PHONES_PER_1000 10^4  -1.4*     -.5   -6.7*** -2.0***    -.6   -.9   -.9*
LOG_CAP_INVEST 10^3    -.4  11.6  28.6*  1.1   3.0*   4.8*   6.8**
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP 10^1 -16.7   -2.9    7.3*  4.0   2.0   4.5**   6.1***
Number of Observations 28 29 28 29 29 29 30
Residual Sum of Squares 10^5 8.2 12.4 48.2 9.6 2.7 11.2 9.7
R-Squared .8974 .6958 .6175 .6915 .7921 .6238 .5596
Adusted R-Squared .8022 .4322 .2623 .4242 .6120 .2978 .2017
Prob > F .0001 .0377 .1585 .0407 .0039 .1148 .1967
***5% level of significance, **10% level of significance, *15% level of significance  
 
The Chow test uses the F-statistic as calculated below in order to test for a structural 
break across the time periods of observation. 
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 The restricted residual sum of squares (RSS) is the pooled model which assumes 
that there are no structural changes across time periods and therefore the data can be 
pooled.  The unrestricted model is the regression model for each year of observation and 
k is the number of explanatory variables included in the regression model. 
 F-statistics calculated for each year of observation exceed the 1% critical F value.  
This result implies that the migration function has undergone a structural change during 
the time period of observation.  Consequently, the fourth null hypothesis that the factors 
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influencing migration are statistically the same across all years of observation is rejected.  
Therefore, the remainder of this discussion is devoted to analyzing the differences in the 
regression results for each year. 
4.8 Comparisons by Year 
 A comparison of the adjusted R-squared values from the 1992 through 1998 
regression results reveals that this model provides for better explanation of migration in 
the years 1992 and 1996 than in the other five years.  Further, the significance of the 
explanatory variables changes across time, for all years of observation.  With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the first year of observed migration in response 
to the changing economic structure is 1992.  Notably, the regression model created in this 
empirical study does an excellent job of explaining the migration push and pull factors in 
this first year of observed migration, with an R-squared value of nearly 90%; adjusted to 
80.2% for comparison with other years of observation.  In contrast, there is not a single 
significant explanatory variable in the 1993 model.  Further, it is worth noting that the 
constant is significant in 1992, which means that the intercept of the net migration 
regression line is statistically different from zero in this year, independent of the 
influences of the explanatory variables.   In the years from 1994 though 1998, the 
explanatory variables in the regression models differ in their level of significance and 
consequential ability to explain migration behavior.  However, the unemployment, 
income, and infrastructure measures consistently play a role in explaining migration, 
although to a varying degree from one time period to another.  The conclusions and 
recommendations to be drawn from these, and other, results are provided in chapter five. 
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4.9 Panel Data Estimation 
In addition to estimating each OLS model by year of observation, panel data 
estimation is conducted to verify the validity of results from the pooled OLS regression 
model presented earlier in this chapter.  A panel data set contains both cross sectional and 
time series data, and therefore is similar to a pooled data set.  Panel data estimation can 
be used in place of OLS to account for variation in time periods and/or across regions that 
might not otherwise be captured in the OLS model.  Previously, an OLS regression was 
conducted on a pooled dataset, including dummy variables for year of observation 
(models 2 and 4 in table 9).  The purpose of this methodology was to account for 
differences across time.  However, the inclusion of 6 additional variables may have 
consumed too many degrees of freedom to provide for trustworthy regression results.  In 
order to validate these pooled data OLS results, an OLS regression was conducted on 
each observed year of data (presented in table 10) and a structural break test was used to 
compare results of the pooled model to the independent year models.  This test indicated 
that a structural change had occurred, which supported the results of the pooled OLS 
regression where 1992 was statistically different from the benchmark year.  However, 
neither of these methodologies allowed for variation within the cross sectional data.  The 
advantage of panel data estimation is that differing characteristics across years of 
observation are provided for, without consuming degrees of freedom with additional 
right-hand-side variables.  Further, the panel data estimation allows for heterogeneity 
across the regions of observation by allowing the cross sectional error term to differ.  In 
other words, the panel data estimation is more powerful because it allows for possible 
differences across both the regions and the time periods of observation. 
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The panel data estimation equation is as follows. 
tiititi euXy ,1,, +++= -ba  
Where y is the net migration rate, the Xs are the independent explanatory variables 
with a 1-year time lag, and the beta values are the coefficients generated in the regression 
model.  Further i is the region of observation and t is the time period of observation.  The 
u error term allows for variation across regions while the e error term allows for variation 
across regions and time periods.  Regression models are run for both the fixed effect and 
the random effect models.  The fixed effect model only allows for variation within the 
estimator, whereas the random effect model allows for both within and between 
variations.  A fixed effect model does not allow for dummy variables, which means the 
CLOSED_CITY variable is not regressed in the fixed effects model, but is included in 
the random effects model.   
Results from both methods of panel data estimation are presented in table 11, as 
are the OLS results from the pooled data analysis.  All independent variables are identical 
to those presented and discussed previously, with the exception of TIME_TREND, which 
is calculated by subtracting the first year of observation from each subsequent year of 
observation.  This time trend variable is included in order to account for any migration 
trend over time that is independent of the observed characteristics.  For consistency in 
comparison of these models, the pooled regression models have been re-run, including 
the TIME_TREND variable.  Results are presented for models including and excluding 
the cross-effect variables. 
TIME_TREND is highly significant in the fixed effect model, but not in the 
pooled or random effect models.  In addition, many of the independent variables that are 
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Table 11: Panel Data Estimation Results (y = net migration rate) 
Independent Variables
Pooled 
Regression
Fixed Effect 
Panel 
Estimation
Random 
Panel 
Estimation
Pooled 
Regression
Fixed Effect 
Panel 
Estimation
Random 
Panel 
Estimation
CONS_    -.0098     .0141     .0046     .0129    -.0014     .0137
TIME_TREND     .0001    -.0013***    -.0002     .0002    -.0009**    -.0000
CLOSED_CITY    -.0008    -.0005    -.0421    -.0723
PRCNT_UNEMP    -.0161***    -.0096*    -.0141***    -.0222***    -.0174**    -.0215***
LOG_AVG_MO_INC    -.0076***    .-0003    -.0045***    -.0071***     .0007    -.0035**
PRCNT_CHILD    -.6281***    -.0462    -.0537**    -.0534***    -.0502    -.0564**
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED     .0670**    -.0065     .0120     .0646*    -.0071     .0160
DOCS_PER_1000    -.0001*     .0002    -.0000    -.0001**     .0001    -.0001
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP    -.0001     .0008     .0003    -.0001     .000     .0001
CRIME_PER_100K    -.0000***    -.0000    -.0000    -.0000***    -.0000    -.0000
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM    -.0000    -.0000    -.0000    -.0000     .0000     .0000
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM    -.0000    -.0000    -.0000    -.0000    -.0000*    -.0000
PHONES_PER_1000    -.0002***     .0000    -.0001***    -.0002***    -.0000    -.0002***
LOG_CAP_INVEST     .0036***    -.0021     .0024**     .0033***    -.0030     .0018
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP     .4654***     .4047***     .4343***     .4527***     .4015***     .4365***
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_UNEMP     .0113     .0099     .0128
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_AVG_MO_INC     .0052    -.0092     .0004
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD    -.2486**    -.2794    -.2187*
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_HIGH_ED    -.5156     .1553    -.4355
CLOSED_CITYxDOCS_PER_1000     .0008**     .0007     .0005
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSESPACE_PER_CAP     .0015     .0026     .0019
CLOSED_CITYxCRIME_PER_100K    -.0000     .0000    -.0000
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSE_COMP_THSQM     .0000     .0000     .0000
CLOSED_CITYxBUS_PASS_MIL/KM    -.0000**     .0000    -.0000
CLOSED_CITYxPHONES_PER_1000     .0002    -.0001     .0002
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_CAP_INVEST     .0013     .0178*     .0056
CLOSED_CITYxORGS&ENT_PER_CAP    -.3178     .1411    -.2683
Number of Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202
Number of Groups 30 30 30 30
R-Squared .3764 .0380 .3534 .4382 .0001 .3487
Adusted R-Squared .3297 .3548
R-Squared within .1761 .1193 .2383 .1800
R-Squared between .0166 .4899 .0000 .3487
sigma_u .0045 .0017 .0748 .0018
sigma_e .0030 .0030 .0030 .0030
rho (fraction of variance due to u_i) .6975 .2519 .9984 .2726
***5% level of significance, **10% level of significance, *15% level of significance  
significant in the pooled and random effect models are not significant in the fixed effect 
model.  A Hausman test is conducted to determine if the random effect models are 
correctly specified. 
 The Hausman specification test is used to test the following hypothesis, for the 
random and fixed effect models, with and without the cross-effects. 
 HO:  There is no systematic difference in coefficients between the fixed effect 
         and random effect models. 
HA:  There is a systematic difference in coefficients between the fixed effect and 
         random effect models. 
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This null hypothesis implies that there is no correlation between the random effects (ui 
and et) and the regressors.  As previously stated, the random effects are the region and 
year of observation.  In other words, rejecting the null hypothesis would imply that the 
year of observation and the region of observation do in fact influence the model.  A 
summary of the Hausman test results is as follows. 
Without Cross Effects: ?2 = 33.72  and Prob = 0.0013 
With Cross Effects: ?2 = 31.40  and Prob = 0.1760 
 Therefore, the random effects and regressors are highly correlated (level of 
significance less than 1%) in the model without the cross effects, and the null hypothesis 
is rejected.  This implies that the random effect model is the correctly specified model, 
and should be used in any subsequent analysis.  The 17.6% level of significance for the 
model with cross effects indicates that it is not as well specified, and the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.  This implies that the fixed effect model is sufficient for analysis 
resulting from the model containing the cross effect variables. 
 The significance of TIME_TREND in the fixed effect model was previously 
noted.  This result is reinforced by the Hausman test results, which conclusively show 
that the year of observation is correlated to the regressors in the model without cross 
effects.  In addition, previous pooled regression results and regressions by year, led to the 
rejection of null hypotheses specifying that migration rates and migration factors did not 
change from one year to another.  Clearly, the year of observation was a significant factor 
in migration rates and migration behavior in the 30 Russian regions analyzed in this 
study. 
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4.10 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter presented and discussed results of several different regression 
models and hypotheses tests.  The OLS results from the pooled regression models led to 
the following conclusions. 
· The presence of a closed city in a region does not impact migration behavior. 
· The migration rate is not the same across all years of observation. 
· The factors that influence migration behavior are not the same in regions that 
contain closed nuclear cities as in regions that do not contain closed nuclear cities. 
· The factors that influence migration behavior are not the same across all years of 
observation. 
 
These results were further supported through both a fixed effect and a random effect 
panel data estimation.  Although the panel data estimation results revealed fewer 
significant variables, the random effect estimator on the model without cross effects 
shows that there is a systematic difference in coefficients when the year and the region 
are both variable.  This reinforces the conclusions that the year of observation does affect 
the migration rate, the region of observation does influence migration behavior, and the 
factors influencing migration are not the same in all observed years.  These and other 
results will be analyzed from a policy perspective in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
“Financing certain projects could help sustain a weapons institute infrastructure in the 
former Soviet Union by keeping institutes in operations that might otherwise have 
curtailed their research functions for lack of funds.” 
United States General Accounting Office96 
5.1 Conclusions 
 Tables in the previous chapter provided coefficient values and levels of 
significance for each of the explanatory variables in the regression models.  The 
coefficient values are extremely small numbers, less than one, because the independent 
variable in the models is the net migration rate, which is calculated as net migration 
divided by population in each year of observation.  In order to see the true magnitude of 
influence from each explanatory variable, it is necessary to consider the population of 
each region.  Doing so will provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the impact 
on migration for each of the significant variables presented and tested in this analysis.  
Regression results show that migration behavior is best explained by this model in the 
year 1992, with an R-squared value of 89.74, and least explained in 1998 when the R-
squared value falls to 55.96.  Table 12 below provides the marginal effects on net 
migration associated with each of the significant variables for these two years.  The 
migration impact is presented for both the smallest and largest regions that do and do not 
contain closed nuclear cities, Tomsk, Sverdlovsk, Evenk, and Bashkortostan, 
respectively.   
The regression coefficients represent the migration into or out of each region that 
results from a one-unit increase in each of the explanatory variables, when all other 
                                                          
96 United States General Accounting Office, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of 
Science Centers Program,” GAO-01-582, May 2001, p. 13. 
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variables are held constant.  The closed city variable assumes a value of zero in the 
regions without closed nuclear cities, and a value of one in the regions containing closed 
nuclear cities.  In the case of the logged variables, an absolute change in the dependent 
variable is equal to the coefficient, b , times the relative change in the dependent 
variable.  Therefore, multiplying the value of the estimated coefficient by 0.01, or 
dividing by one hundred, will generate the absolute change in the dependent variable that 
results from a one percent increase in the explanatory variable.  Accounting for these 
calculations results in the following net migration effects on the smallest and largest 
regions with and without closed nuclear cities based on the statistically significant 
variables in the years 1992 and 1998. 
Table 12: Marginal Effects on Net Migration of Statistically Significant Variables in 
Smallest and Largest Regions, With and Without Nuclear Cities 
Significant Variables
Evenk Bashkortostan Tomsk Sverdlovsk
Constant** 2122.13 356711.63 95752.08 419420.44
Presence of a Closed                   
Nuclear City*** 0.00 0.00 -4275.51 -18727.89
1% Increase in Children in the 
Population** -1191.10 -200213.72 -53743.35 -235410.67
1% Increase in Higher 
Education*** 11472.83 1928487.59 517663.78 2267509.80
1% Increase in Doctors                           
per 1000*** -9.85 -1655.64 -444.42 -1946.69
1% Increase in Crimes          
per 100,000*** -0.19 -32.27 -8.66 -37.95
1% Increase in Bus 
Passengers** 0.04 6.05 1.62 7.12
1% Increase in Phones                           
per 1000* -3.24 -545.42 -146.41 -641.31
1% Increase in Average 
Monthly Income** -3.70 -621.67 -166.87 -730.96
1% Increase in Phones                        
per 1000* -2.27 -382.04 -102.55 -449.20
1% Increase in Capital 
Investment** 1.63 273.52 73.42 321.60
1% Increase in Organizations 
and Enterprises*** 14689.44 2469172.05 662799.67 2903244.93
19
92
Regions Without Closed 
Nuclear City
Regions With Closed Nuclear 
City
19
98
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 The number of phones per 1000 people is the only variable that is significant in 
both the first year of observed migration and the last year of observed migration.  Table 
11 shows that a 1% increase in the number of phones per 1000 people resulted in a 
minimum of 2.27 and a maximum of 641.31 people to emigrate from a region in the years 
1992 and 1998.  The presence of a closed nuclear city explained a large amount of 
emigration from a region in the year following the break up of the Soviet Union (between 
4275.51 and 18727.89 migrants), but is insignificant as time passes.  This might indicate 
that the scientists and engineers in the closed nuclear cities emigrated to major cities like 
Moscow, or left Russia entirely, immediately after the collapse.  It is logical to assume 
that these individuals would have been highly mobile due to their higher incomes, 
advanced education, and specialized training.  This exact scenario created the concern of 
nuclear proliferation and Russian brain drain that came to the forefront of international 
interest in the early 1990s. 
 It is noteworthy that the significant explanatory variables in 1992 are primarily 
personal or residential characteristics.  In 1998, the significant explanatory variables are 
primarily economic infrastructure characteristics, with the exception of monthly income.  
However, as presented in chapter 4, the coefficient on the log of monthly income is 
negative, indicating that a one-percent increase in the level of income results in migration 
out of a region.  This is an extremely important conclusion because it implies that 
programs designed to increase income level as a means of enticing individuals to 
immigrate, may actually be counter-productive.  Rather, it appears that programs 
designed to increase infrastructure are more likely to result in positive migration. 
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5.2 Policy Recommendations 
In order to provide precise policy recommendations regarding the closed nuclear 
weapons complex cities of the Russian Federation, it is necessary to know if the 
migration for these cities has been occurring at the same rate and in the same direction as 
migration for the region in which the city is located.  Unfortunately, the previously secret 
nature of these cities during the Soviet era, and the current closed access to the cities, 
means that migration and population characteristics data are not available in open source 
literature; the reason for using regional data in this research.  However, a recent study by 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reports the findings of surveys 
conducted in 1999 at three nuclear weapons complex cities.97  This report finds that 
migration into the closed nuclear weapons cities was rapid immediately after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, but then slowed considerably throughout the latter half of 
the 1990s.  Although this particular report does not find large amounts of out-migration 
from the closed cities, another recently published thesis regarding Russia’s chemical and 
biological facilities, finds that the “chemical and biological weapons (CBW) brain drain 
from Russia during the 1990s did occur to a very limited degree.  Iran and Syria were 
successful in finding and employing some Russian CBW expertise.”98  On April 10, 
2003, the USA Today reported that North Korea became “the first country to quit the 33-
year-old global treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons, amid indications that it is 
continuing preparations to become a serial producer of nuclear bombs.”99  Three months 
prior, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It is in this era 
                                                          
97 Tikhonov, 2001. 
98 Volodymyr, S. “Analysis of the Brain Drain Phenomenon in the Field of Development of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons in Russia During the 1990s.” Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. June 2002. 
99 Barbara Slavin, “North Korea Pulls out of Non-Nuclear Treaty Today,” USA Today, 04-10-2003, p A10. 
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of nuclear ambitions by aggressive nations that the migration of highly trained weapons 
production scientists and engineers from the Former Soviet Union has come to the 
forefront of economic and social policy both in the U.S. and abroad.  While this 
dissertation and other recent publications find that the emigration has slowed 
considerably during the past several years, the reality is that a single individual can 
disrupt the nuclear balance of power in today’s world economy.  Therefore, U.S. policies 
and programs directed toward aiding the Russian government in preventing emigration 
are still essential for maintaining international stability. 
This study has revealed that Russian migration behavior and probable causes have 
changed in the years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Whereas initially, 
migration resulted from personal and residential characteristics, in later years emigration 
was slowed by economic factors such as investment in capital and an increased number 
of organizations and enterprises.  Most notable is the revelation that increasing incomes 
in a region actually resulted in greater out-migration, rather than the anticipated in-
migration.  These results generate the following policy recommendations.   
The United States should discontinue the funding of Russian Federation programs 
designed to provide increased salaries to scientists and engineers, or funding them to 
conduct research and development efforts in the weapons complex facilities.  Rather, 
U.S. spending should be directed toward programs that will increase infrastructure in the 
Russian economy and support the creation of new businesses.  This recommendation is 
further supported by the literature review of policies to prevent emigration of skilled 
labor, presented in chapter 2, which concluded that the most effective policies are those 
directed toward development of new industries and transportation infrastructure.   
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One method of accomplishing this goal is to provide entrepreneurs with loans for 
investment in facilities and equipment in the new capitalist economy.  Another method is 
to invest in transportation and communication infrastructure in the weapons complex 
cities and regions, and cease funding for any destruction of capital and infrastructure.  In 
many existing FSU weapons complex facilities (specifically chemical and biological), the 
cost of conversion to non-weapons production is estimated to be greater than the cost of 
destruction.  Consequently, international funding is put toward establishing procedures 
and paying salaries to clean and destroy existing facilities.  However, based on results 
from this study, destruction of these facilities may be less costly in the present time 
period, but current spending to convert facilities and rebuild capital will be more 
beneficial in the long run.  Essentially, an increase in capital investment in the Russian 
economy will enable long-term growth and provide employment opportunities for all 
Russian citizens, thus reducing the need of individuals to emigrate elsewhere, and 
consequently reducing the threat of proliferation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  108 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Program Analysis 
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) 
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC&A) 
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) 
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) 
 
 Appendix B:  Data Appendix and Descriptive Statistics 
 Appendix C:  Correlation Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  109 
 
Appendix A: Program Analysis 
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Glen E. Schweitzer was sent to 
Moscow by the United States Department of State as the first executive director of the 
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC).   In his book, Moscow DMZ, 
Schweitzer provides a detail account of the process involved in establishing this program, 
the difficulties encountered, and the successes attained.  The ISTC was established in 
Moscow in 1992 by the United States, twelve European nations, Russia and Japan in an 
effort to help Russia downsize its military establishment.  Schweitzer explains that the 
principle task of the ISTC was “to help prevent a nuclear brain drain from Russia into 
countries on our not-so-favored list and at the same time to encourage Russia to use its 
military technologies in rebuilding a civilian science and technology base that could lead 
to a healthier economy.”100 
Since that time, several other U.S. funded and sponsored programs have been 
established, all with the goal of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction materials and knowledge.  The methodology employed to accomplish this 
task varies from one program to another.  Some focus money and effort on preventing the 
emigration of scientists and engineers from the former Soviet Weapons complex, while 
others focus on transforming the capital and infrastructure to non-weapons applications.  
Still others are directed toward the dismantlement and destruction of weapons complex 
facilities that remain in Russia and other countries of the Former Soviet Union.  
Regardless of the tactic used, all of these programs have maintained a goal of preventing 
proliferation.  Some, like the ISTC, specify a secondary desire to aid the Russian 
                                                          
100 Schweitzer, p 5. 
  110 
 
economy through the transition from a socialist to capitalist structure such that long-term 
economic gains and growth will be attained.  In reality, the two goals go hand-in-hand 
because long run economic growth in Russia is essential to guarantee employment of 
scientists and engineers of the former Soviet weapons complex. 
The remainder of this appendix provides a summary of the existing U.S. programs 
that are directed toward nonproliferation in the Russian Federation, and to explain the 
methodology employed in each program, as well as the specific goals of each program, 
the activities occurring, and the progress to date. 
Table 13 shows program activity in each of the ten closed nuclear weapons cities. 
Table 13: Programs in Russian Closed Nuclear Cities 
Closed 
Nuclear City ISTC MPC&A IPP NCI 
Lesnoy   v     
Novouralsk   v     
Ozersk v v     
Sarov v v v v 
Seversk v v v v 
Snezhinsk v v     
Trekhgornyy   v     
Zarechnyy   v     
Zelenogorsk   v     
Zheleznogorsk v v v v 
 
 
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) 
The previously mentioned ISTC, established in 1992, is the largest threat 
reduction program supported by the State Department, with the U.S. contributing 30-70% 
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of the program’s budget each year.  Since 1992, Norway, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Republic of Korea have joined the founding states of the 
ISTC and have committed to the principles of nonproliferation.  The objectives of the 
ISTC are defined as follows. 
· To give the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) weapons 
scientists, particularly those with knowledge and skills related to weapons 
of mass destruction and their delivery systems, opportunities to redirect 
their talents to peaceful activities;  
· To contribute to solving national and international technical problems;  
· To support the transition to market-based economies;  
· To support basic and applied research;  
· To encourage the integration of CIS weapons scientists into the 
international scientific community.101 
 
The ISTC uses U.S. funds, as well as those contributed by other countries, to 
provide short-term grants and contracts to Russian weapons of mass destruction 
scientists.  The grants are designed to fund peaceful scientific and technical research, the 
results of which can be patented and sold in the new capitalistic Russian economy, or to 
businesses or governments of other nations.  According to the ISTC website, 1,600 
projects had been funded by April 2002, valued at $420 million (U.S.), and providing 
grant payments to over 30,000 individuals.  More specifically, as of July 9, 2002, total 
funding for ISTC projects was $435,624,579.  The United States of America has 
contributed 36% of this total, the European Union has contributed 27.2%, and Japan has 
contributed 12.1%. 102 
The ISTC administers and manages numerous supporting programs to aid the 
literally hundreds of ISTC projects occurring at any time.  The most notable of these 
programs are the Science Project Program, the Partner Program, and the Patent Support 
                                                          
101 International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), http://www.istc.ru. 
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Program, each of which is discussed below.  Additional efforts include business 
management training to assist project managers in developing their general business 
knowledge and presentation skills, regularly held workshop to highlight the technologies 
and topics of global significance, periodic seminars on a broad range of technical 
interests and nonproliferation initiatives, and travel grant programs to cover expenses for 
scientists to travel internationally for meetings relevant to their specializations. 
The Science Project Program is designed to reduce the threat of proliferation of 
technical expertise and knowledge of those scientists and engineers from the Soviet 
weapons complex that became unemployed and/or received erratic- or non-payment of 
salaries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Many of these individuals posses the 
nuclear, chemical, and/or biological know-how that many rogue nations would pay vast 
amounts of money to obtain.  The goal of the ISTC Science Project Program is to keep 
them employed and productive in Russia or other FSU nations such that they will not 
experience the economic need to sell their knowledge to the highest bidder. 
This goal is tackled by “soliciting scientific project proposals from institutes 
throughout the CIS and providing funding and logistic support to project teams.”103  The 
project proposals must be peaceful in nature and must address the nonproliferation 
objectives of the ISTC.  Special consideration is given to proposals related to 
environmental monitoring and remediation, vaccines, immunology, and pathology, 
nuclear safety and materials safeguarding, chemical process engineering, and power 
production.  Project proposals are reviewed by all parties to the ISTC for their adherence 
to the ISTC objectives and for technical excellence.  Once a project has been funded, the 
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terms and conditions for participation in the project are specified in a Project Agreement 
that is signed both by the CIS institute receiving the funding and by the ISTC.   
The second notable program of the ISTC is the Partner Program.  This program 
“provides opportunities for private industry, scientific institutions, and other 
governmental or non-governmental organizations to fund research at CIS institutions via 
the ISTC.”104  The Partner Program is extremely beneficial both to the partners and to the 
CIS institutes.  The partner companies or governments are able to make tax-free direct 
payments to the CIS project teams and are provided duty-free import of project 
equipment.  The CIS institutes and project teams have the opportunity to apply their 
technical skills to important scientific and industrial problems and are able to work in 
close cooperation with foreign partners.  This type of partnership begins when the 
potential partner is introduced to the ISTC by the nation on whose territory the partner is 
located.  The partner, the ISTC project manager, and the CIS institute work together to 
develop technical proposals and terms for participation in projects, which are then 
approved by the ISTC if they meet and adhere to program goals.  All terms and 
conditions of participation in the partner projects are detailed in a Partner Project 
Agreement, which is signed by the CIS institute, the Partner, and the ISTC.  All funding 
for the project comes from the partner, who determines the appropriate level of funding 
based on the technical work plan that was previously developed in consultation with the 
CIS institute. 
The ISTC Partner Program not only provides a means of attaining additional 
funding for the nonproliferation of scientific knowledge and skill from the FSU, it also 
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provides the opportunity for companies and governments outside of Russia to develop 
potential long term relationships with CIS institutes and employees, often at a lower cost 
to the partner than if the same work were done within its own company, country, or 
elsewhere. 
Another significant ISTC program is the Patent Support Program, which 
“recognizes the contribution of ISTC projects and their participants to new inventions and 
ideas that have commercial value.”105  Quite simply, the ISTC Secretariat administers 
program funds to pay the costs associated with the initial stages of patenting of inventions 
and ideas generated through the Science Project Program.  The purpose is to generate 
current and long-term revenues for CIS institutes and employees from the sale of 
patented ideas for commercial uses.  It is essential that scientists and engineers engaging 
in research and development efforts obtain patents in order to reap the economic gains 
from their efforts.  This type of capitalistic mentality was not present in the Soviet Union, 
as all R&D efforts were government ordered and directed.  In the new Russian economy, 
the ability of individuals and businesses to reap economic gains from private property 
rights and patents is essential for the long run economic growth of the economy. 
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC&A) 
 The Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC&A) is often 
regarded as one of the most important efforts to reduce the proliferation threat because it 
establishes security systems around the hundreds of buildings and facilities that house 
weapons-usable nuclear materials in Russia.  This program was established in 1994 after 
the United States and Russia signed the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase 
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Agreement that specified the terms under which the U.S. would buy HEU from Russia 
and mix it with natural uranium (a process called “down-blending”) such that it could be 
used as commercial reactor fuel.  This 1993 agreement established the MPC&A program 
in an effort to improve the security of Russia’s fissile material by building a storage 
facility, consolidating the fissile material at fewer sites, and increasing the physical 
security of the material.  This effort is referred to as a “first line of defense” against 
proliferation as it secures the fissile materials where they are located. 
 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that “Russia inherited 
approximately 603 metric tons of HEU and plutonium” with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.106  This material is located at civilian research centers, naval fuel storage sites, 
and nuclear weapons laboratories throughout Russia.  The material is generally 
considered to be attractive to thieves because it is not very radioactive, and is relatively 
easily transported by one or two individuals.  Therefore, the security of this material is 
essential to prevent proliferation.  The MPC&A increases security of this material in 
three ways: 1) physical protection systems, such as fences, metal doors, and video 
surveillance systems; 2) material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear 
material containers that indicate tampering or theft; and 3) material accounting systems, 
such as inventory systems and computerized databases that allow sites to keep track of 
the amount and type of nuclear material in specific buildings.107 
 The MPC&A Program has experienced some difficulties in establishing adequate 
security systems at some sites, as Minatom has restricted access for national security 
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reasons.  Despite this complication, as of February 2001, the program had either finished 
installing or was in the process of installing security systems in 115 buildings, which 
secured about 32% of the fissile material identified as being at risk of theft from 
Russia.108  At that time, the MPC&A Program and Minatom had reached a draft 
agreement to allow greater access to the other sites in order to begin needed security 
upgrades that will protect hundreds of metric tons of fissile materials housed in 104 other 
buildings and laboratories in Russia. 
 In addition to providing the initial upgrades of the fissile material security 
systems, the MPC&A Program provides on-site long-term assistance for three or more 
years, as well as two support centers in Obninsk that train personnel in operating the 
systems.  Other MPC&A Program projects include “the development of national 
regulations and laws, training of trainers, development of a computerized federal 
information system, and other related tasks.”109  Unfortunately, these security measures 
are only achieved at a hefty price to the United States.  The U.S. General Accounting 
Office estimates the total MPC&A Program costs in Russia through the year 2020 at $2.2 
billion.  This figure does not include the additional $474.7 million estimated cost for 
security systems at 42 Russian Navy nuclear weapons storage sites.110 
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) 
 In 1994, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program was established 
to provide assistance to the Russian scientific community by inviting weapons scientists 
and technicians to participate in projects focused on the commercialization of non-
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weapons technology.  The IPP facilitates joint ventures between U.S. businesses and 
weapons of mass destruction scientists in the former Soviet Union by linking them 
together through Department of Energy national laboratories to “provide viable, long-
term, sustainable non-weapons related jobs.”111  The IPP projects are categorized in three 
phases: Thrust 1, Thrust 2, and Thrust 3.  In the Thrust 1 phase, projects that have been 
identified as commercially feasible technologies are funded by the Department of Energy 
national laboratories.  In Thrust 2, a United States industry partner is identified and this 
partner agrees to share the cost of developing the potential technologies.  Finally, in 
Thrust 3, successful projects become self-sustaining business ventures, providing long-
term economic benefits to the Russian Federation and the U.S. business partner. 
 As of June 2000, the IPP had approved 511 projects, which engaged over 8,000 
scientists, engineers, and other staff members at more than 170 Russian institutes.112  
However, the program has been frequently criticized for the lack of appropriated funds 
that actually reach Russian scientists.  In 1997, one DOE official reported that 46.5 
percent of the monies intended for the program are diverted to pay taxes and other 
facility-specific costs.113  In February 1999, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
reported that only $23.7 million of the $63.5 million spent on the IPP program went to 
scientific institutes in the Newly Independent States (NIS).  The other $39.8 million was 
spent in the United States, largely on oversight and implementation programs of the 
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DOE’s national laboratories.114  Proponents of IPP agree that the initial set-up costs for 
the program have significantly reduced the amount of funding that reaches Russian 
institutes, but point out that many of these were one-time set-up costs that will not be 
incurred again.  Therefore, the program is expected to have a greater impact in the future. 
 Despite past problems, several IPP projects are worth noting.  One example is the 
California-based microchip manufacturer, Intel, which began operations in Sarov under 
the IPP program in the latter half of the 1990s.  As of February 1999, the Sarov operation 
was employing 65 VNIIEF scientists in developing computer software for three-
dimensional graphics, and had hopes of increasing the number of programmers to 200 
over the next several years.115 
 Another example is a project in Snezhinsk that is jointly funded by IPP and the 
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI).  The Strela Open Computing Center opened in November 
2000 and was expected to employ 120 nuclear weapons specialists from VNIITF in the 
first year of operation.116  The Center is involved in civilian high-tech projects including 
software programming, computer modeling, computer-assisted engineering and 
computer-assisted design. 
 Kenneth A. Myers III, Legislative Assistant for National Security and Foreign 
Affairs for Senator Richard G. Lugar, recently stated, “Despite criticisms of the program 
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raised by a GAO report two years ago, the IPP now seems to be on a much stronger 
footing.”117 
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) 
 The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) is the only U.S. government program 
specifically focused on accelerating the downsizing of Russia’s nuclear weapons 
production capability by creating alternative employment opportunities for the scientists 
and workers that would be displaced during the transition to a smaller nuclear complex.  
The program was established by the Department of Energy in September 1998, and 
currently focuses its efforts on three closed cities:  Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk.  
However, the NCI plans to expand the focus to all 10 closed nuclear cities and 
approximately 127,000 workers over the next several years. 118 The main difference 
between the NCI and the three previously mentioned programs is that the NCI targets the 
creation of sustainable civilian jobs, whereas the others provide more temporary fixes for 
the problem.  At its inception, the goal of the NCI was to “help the cities to become more 
self-sufficient by converting production to reflect the demands of a consumer-oriented 
market, by creating jobs in the civilian sector, and by attracting private investment to aid 
in the conversion process.”119 
 As previously mentioned, the NCI provided a portion of the funding for the Strela 
Open Computing Center in Snezhinsk, which opened in November 2000.  Another NCI 
project in Snezhinsk is the Identification Technologies Company (ITEC), which opened 
in April 2001.  This civilian enterprise markets equipment and provides support services 
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for bar coding and other digital identification technologies for business and government 
customers in the Russian Federation.  This particular enterprise employs four full-time 
and ten part-time personnel from VNIITF.120 
 In Sarov, at the Avangard Electromechanical Plant, the NCI helped initiate a 
March 23, 2000 contract for the plant to manufacture kidney dialysis equipment.  The 
existing Avangard facilities will be converted to support the manufacturing of the dialysis 
equipment, which will create jobs for several hundred former weapons specialists.121 
 NCI projects in Zheleznogorsk include a program to study the environmental 
impact of radioactive waste, production of medical bandages, commercial use of 
radioisotope technology, and rare earth metal refining.122  In addition, the International 
Development Center was established in Zheleznogorsk in November 1999 to help 
support NCI program goals throughout the region. 
 In spite of these success stories, the NCI has faced dubious challenges.  
According to an article in Science Magazine, one of the biggest challenges for NCI 
managers is to infuse a market-driven culture into the nuclear cities. 123  Another major 
stepping stone is the security of the cities themselves, which limits visits and 
communication, making business contacts difficult, not to mention the geographically 
remote nature of many of the cities.    
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Further, as with the IPP, a large portion of the NCI funds never reach the closed 
cities of the Russian Federation.  From fiscal year 1999 through December 2000, 
expenditures for NCI totaled about $15.9 million, of which $11.2 million (70 percent) 
was spend in the United States.124  This enormous expenditure in the U.S. was due to the 
national laboratories’ costs to implement the program, including overhead, labor, 
equipment, and travel.  Again, many of these costs were part of the start-up of the NCI 
program, and will not be incurred again in the future.  In addition, some of the projects 
are now being managed directly from DOE headquarters, in order to reduce the overhead 
costs incurred at the national laboratories. 
On a more positive note, International Development Centers (IDCs) have been 
established through the NCI in two of the previously closed cities, Zheleznogorsk and 
Snezhinsk, to provide city residents with training in various areas of business 
development.  In 2000, the Zheleznogorsk IDC trained more than 60 city residents in the 
use of project software that resulted in the city receiving $17 million in revenues125.  The 
IDCs are also able to alleviate some of the communication challenges between the closed 
cities and the potential business partners by providing places for them to interact in a 
professional environment.  With many of the overhead costs already incurred, it is 
expected that the NCI will generate huge success in the future. 
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Appendix B:  Data Appendix and Descriptive Statistics 
 
“Proliferation Concerns in the Russian Closed Nuclear Weapons Complex Cities: A 
Study of Regional Migration Behavior,” by Kristin Flores, University of New Mexico, 
Doctoral Dissertation, July 2004. 
 
Data:  migration.txt (Stata format) 
This dissertation utilizes a panel data set, including aggregate data from 30 regions of the 
Russian Federation, across 7 years of observation.  The dependent variable, thirteen 
independent variables, and 12 interaction terms are constructed from open source 
literature, as described below. 
 
Primary data for this dissertation are from Russia and Eurasia Facts and Figures Annual, 
formerly USSR Facts and Figures Annual (1991 – 1997).  Each yearly volume contains 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental statistics for each of the Russian regions, 
compiled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Congress, several 
departments of the U.S. government, Soviet handbooks, United Nations Yearbooks, the 
World and Soviet Press, as well as encyclopedias, monographs, and histories of Russia 
and the Soviet Union.  For these analyses, the data were created by compiling 
information from each yearly volume, for each of the 33 Russian regions of interest.  All 
data are aggregate by region of observation, and the final sample includes 30 regions, due 
to incomplete data in three regions.  Thirteen independent variables span the time period 
from 1991 to 1997, and are used directly as reported, except when divided by population 
to generate a per capita figure, or logged in the instance of monetary values.  The 12 
interaction terms are created by multiplying the closed nuclear weapons city dummy 
variable value (0 or 1) by each of the remaining 12 independent variables. 
 
A second source, The Territories of the Russian Federation 2001, is used to supplement 
the population data for each of the Russian regions in 1998, as the Russia and Eurasia 
Facts and Figures Annual for 1998 is not yet available.  Independent variable statistics 
are not collected in 1998, due to the one-year time lag used in each of the migration 
models presented in this research.  The dependent variable, net migration rate, is 
calculated as the difference in population between two subsequent years, plus the death 
rate in the base year, minus the birth rate in the base year, all divided by the base year 
population.  The final sample includes net migration rates from 1992 through 1998, for 
each of the 30 Russian regions of interest. 
 
Descriptive statistics for each variable in this data set are presented in table 14 on the 
following page. 
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
Value
Maximum 
Value
MIG_RATE 0.00 0.01 -0.14 0.02
1992 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
1993 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
1994 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
1995 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
1996 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
1997 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
1998 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
CLOSED_CITY 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
PRCNT_UNEMP 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.60
LOG_AVG_MO_INC 1.96 0.24 1.43 2.73
PRCNT_CHILD 1.09 7.00 0.02 64.00
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED 0.19 2.65 0.00 41.20
DOCS_PER_1000 39.52 7.10 0.01 60.50
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP 23.64 102.87 11.90 1688.00
CRIME_PER_100K 1718.30 608.56 12.90 3655.00
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM 590.38 570.35 1.00 5305.00
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM 2974.71 2248.31 12.00 17963.00
PHONES_PER_1000 94.25 507.18 31.60 7864.00
LOG_CAP_INVEST 8.72 0.65 6.54 10.41
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_UNEMP 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.60
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_AVG_MO_INC 0.36 0.77 0.00 2.45
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.16
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_HIGH_ED 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
CLOSED_CITYxDOCS_PER_1000 7.49 16.18 0.00 60.50
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSESPACE_PER_CAP 3.18 6.78 0.00 19.10
CLOSED_CITYxCRIME_PER_100K 341.02 763.80 0.00 3198.00
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSE_COMP_THSQM 151.63 373.26 0.00 2041.00
CLOSED_CITYxBUS_PASS_MIL/KM 859.81 2137.02 0.00 8566.00
CLOSED_CITYxPHONES_PER_1000 8.83 19.29 0.00 84.40
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_CAP_INVEST 1.64 3.48 0.00 9.84
CLOSED_CITYxORGS&ENT_PER_CAP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02  
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Appendix C:  Variable Correlations 
Table 15: Variable Correlations 
CLOSED_ 
CITY
PRCNT_ 
UNEMP
LOG_AVG_ 
MO_INC
PRCNT_ 
CHILD
PRCNT_IN_ 
HIGH_ED
DOCS_PER
_ 1000
CLOSED_CITY 1.0000
PRCNT_UNEMP 0.0442 1.0000
LOG_AVG_MO_INC 0.0840 0.2004 1.0000
PRCNT_CHILD -0.3157 0.3123 0.2235 1.0000
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED 0.2185 0.1216 0.0101 -0.0858 1.0000
DOCS_PER_1000 0.0931 0.1565 0.1953 -0.0819 0.4505 1.0000
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP 0.1497 0.2061 0.0510 -0.5904 0.0997 0.1318
CRIME_PER_100K 0.1323 0.1144 0.0821 0.2995 0.1845 0.2204
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM 0.2117 -0.2459 0.1982 -0.0202 -0.0675 -0.0128
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM 0.4244 -0.2770 0.2754 -0.2204 -0.0289 0.1464
PHONES_PER_1000 -0.0935 0.4617 0.2562 0.2474 0.1755 0.2329
LOG_CAP_INVEST 0.2706 -0.1398 0.6002 -0.0711 -0.0001 0.1960
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP -0.0527 0.6867 0.2822 0.3055 0.1228 0.2980
HOUSE 
SPACE_ 
PER_CAP
CRIME_ 
PER_100K
HOUSE_ 
COMP_TH 
SQM
BUS_PASS_
MIL/KM
PHONES_ 
PER_1000
LOG_CAP_ 
INVEST
CLOSED_CITY
PRCNT_UNEMP
LOG_AVG_MO_INC
PRCNT_CHILD
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED
DOCS_PER_1000
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP 1.0000
CRIME_PER_100K -0.3700 1.0000
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM -0.1494 -0.0734 1.0000
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM -0.0040 0.0015 0.6863 1.0000
PHONES_PER_1000 0.2720 0.1606 -0.2035 -0.2147 1.0000
LOG_CAP_INVEST 0.0545 0.0478 -0.6937 0.7328 0.0273 1.0000
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP 0.2695 0.2285 -0.2092 -0.2092 0.5853 -0.0510  
 The above tables reveal few strongly correlated variables.  Those with absolute 
correlation values greater than .5000 are shown in bold text.  Four out of the seven 
strongly correlated pairs (in the lower table) include economic and capital growth 
variables.  It is logical that the availability of transportation (proxied by 
BUS_PASS__MIL/KM) is positively correlated with HOUSE_COMP__THSQM, which 
is a measure of production.  Similarly, greater investment in capital 
(LOG_CAP_INVEST) will directly affect the availability of transportation.  In addition, 
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as the number of businesses (ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP) increases, it make sense that 
communication infrastructure will grow (proxied by PHONES_PER_1000). Unexplained 
is the negative correlation between LOG_CAP_INVEST and HOUS_COMP_THSQM, 
which one might expect to be positively correlated.  One possible explanation is that 
capital investment is directed only toward business and infrastructure growth and not 
toward personal investment, which would include housing.  This explanation is logical if 
the source of capital investment is largely foreigners, who are interested in Russian 
business opportunities, not the well being of Russian citizens.  The other three pairs of 
strongly correlated variables are presented in the upper table and warrant some 
explanation as well. 
The negative correlation between HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP and 
PRCNT_CHILD might simply be the result of the per capita calculation.  If the number 
of children in families increases (proxied by PRCNT_CHILD) then the housing space per 
person will decrease, and vise versa.  The strong positive relationship between 
LOG_CAP_INVEST and LOG_AVG_MO_INC is expected, due to the fact that both 
measures reflect the availability of rubles in the Russian economy.  The strong positive 
correlation between ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP and PRCNT_UNEMP is not obvious on 
the surface.  The assumption is that unemployment rates will fall as the result of business 
growth, which would yield a negative correlation.  However, the other possibility is that 
high rates of unemployment lead to greater emigration from a region.  This means fewer 
individuals in the economy, causing businesses per capita calculation to decrease.  
Therefore, as with the HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP variable discussed above, this positive 
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correlation may be the result of the per capita calculation, rather than a direct relationship 
between the two variables. 
 With the exception of the seven correlated pairs discussed above, these tables 
show that the variables used in the regression analyses, presented in chapter 4, are 
generally uncorrelated with one another.  However, in order to further confirm this 
conclusion, the four pooled regression models are rerun, including a lagged net migration 
rate variable as a dependent variable.  The results of these regressions are presented in 
table 16 on the next page. 
The new independent variable NET_MIG_RATE(Y-1) is positive and significant 
in all four models, which indicates that the net migration rate in one time period 
positively influences the net migration rate in the next time period.  However, a 
comparison of the models in table 9 and table 16 show that there is little or no difference 
in the direction of influence or the level of significance for any of the remaining 
independent variables.  In addition, the R-squared and adjusted R-squared values are 
nearly identical, regardless of whether or not NET_MIG_RATE(Y-1) is included as an 
explanatory variable.  These results reinforce the validity of the results and conclusions 
generated in this research. 
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Table 16: Regression Results with Lagged Net Migration Rate (y = net migration rate) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1993 -.0019703 -.0013025
1994  .0028932**  .0034171***
1995  .0000496  .0009403
1996 -.0005304  .0004309
1997  .0008397  .0017828
1998  .0007286  .0018971
CONSTANT  .0095073  .0071172  .0120386  .0096803
NET_MIG_RATE (Y-1)  .0472396**  .0482072***  .0474273**  .0453897**
CLOSED_CITY -.0008008 -.0009141 -.0522397  .0039724
PRCNT_UNEMP -.0152921*** -.014034*** -.0193370*** -.0189933***
LOG_AVG_MO_INC -.0068322*** -.0087656*** -.0061378*** -.0074220***
PRCNT_CHILD -.0565496*** -.0539609*** -.0456446** -.0418539**
PRCNT_IN_HIGH_ED  .0648038**  .0740463**  .0629001*  .0675746**
DOCS_PER_1000 -.0000646 -.0000726* -.0000820* -.0000864**
HOUSESPACE_PER_CAP -.0000412 -.0000992 -.0000032 -.0000266
CRIME_PER_100K -.0000016*** -.0000016*** -.0000017*** -.0000015***
HOUSE_COMP_THSQM -.0000006 -.0000010 -.0000007 -.0000011
BUS_PASS_MIL/KM -.0000002 -.0000002 -.0000001 -.0000001
PHONES_PER_1000 -.0001462*** -.0001452*** -.0001711*** -.0001754***
LOG_CAP_INVEST  .0031178***  .0039261***  .0026913**  .0032491***
ORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP  .4275937***  .3641502***  .4402154***  .3258656***
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_UNEMP  .0094355  .0122945
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_AVG_MO_INC  .0042634  .0039965
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_CHILD -.2297714** -.2108685*
CLOSED_CITYxPRCNT_HIGH_ED -.5210687 -.3216134
CLOSED_CITYxDOCS_PER_1000  .0007554**  .0001883
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSESPACE_PER_CAP  .0016005  .0000408
CLOSED_CITYxCRIME_PER_100K -.0000010  .0000017
CLOSED_CITYxHOUSE_COMP_THSQM  .0000063  .0000006
CLOSED_CITYxBUS_PASS_MIL/KM -.0000018** -.0000009
CLOSED_CITYxPHONES_PER_1000  .0002043  .0002224*
CLOSED_CITYxLOG_CAP_INVEST  .0023843 -.0002380
CLOSED_CITYxORGS&ENTS_PER_CAP -.3249623 -.1683770
Number of Observations 202 202 202 202
R-Squared .3876 .4731 .4479 .5167
Adusted R-Squared .3417 .4149 .3659 .4252
***5% level of significance, **10% level of significance, *15% level of significance  
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